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ARTICLE
DISRUPTING SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Christopher G. Bradley *
P0F

ABSTRACT
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs
secured transactions in personal property in all fifty states and
has been lauded as “the most successful commercial statute ever.”
But while Article 9 has facilitated commerce and economic growth,
it remains complicated and inefficient in numerous respects. Its
weaknesses are well known but have been considered necessary
evils, accepted because no better approaches were available. But
just as the UCC was motivated initially by the idea of streamlining
the law to accommodate modern commerce, now that goal should
motivate revision of the UCC itself.
This Article proposes to remove and replace a primary
structural component of Article 9 of the UCC—the filing system by
which secured creditors put others on notice of their interest in
items of collateral. The proposal would jettison this outdated and
often ineffective method of providing notice of security interests,
and instead, would look to modern technologies to stake clearer
and more reliable claims on collateral. It would no longer be
necessary to file financing statements indexed under the name
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and location of the owner of collateral. Instead, the proposed
regime would allow creditors to stake their claims directly—by
means of online “smart” maps or by electronic tags identifying
interests in particular items of collateral—and would eliminate
numerous arcane, inefficient, and inequitable features of the
current regime.
The proposal serves the broader goals of commercial law as
well, by reducing needless legal complexity and more closely
aligning legal requirements with business realities. The
“disruptive” changes proposed in this Article would increase
certainty in commerce and shape secured transactions law to
emerging practices in business and finance.
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INTRODUCTION

[The Uniform Commercial Code] is an honest effort to state
basic rules of commercial law which reflect, more accurately
and flexibly than do the present rules, going methods of operation.
–Grant Gilmore, Principal Drafter of UCC Article 9, 1952 1
P1 F

The picture for the business man then is that the [Uniform
Commercial] Code will make his law come home and be
friendly and be understood. It will eliminate something of
which he isn’t fully conscious—the unnecessary tax on his
business that legal uncertainty now imposes.
–Karl Llewellyn, Chief Reporter of Uniform Commercial Code,
1953 2
P2 F

[T]he Internet will disappear . . . . There will be so many IP
addresses…so many devices, sensors, things that you are
wearing, things that you are interacting with that you won’t
even sense it . . . . It will be part of your presence all the time.
Imagine you walk into a room, and the room is dynamic. And
with your permission and all of that, you are interacting with
the things going on in the room.
–Eric Schmidt, Chair of Google, Inc., 2015 3
P3F

Article 9 of the UCC governs secured transactions in personal
property in all fifty states as well as Puerto Rico and the District
of Columbia. 4 It has facilitated billions of dollars of commerce,
served as a model for reforms around the world, and been widely
P4F

P

1. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61
YALE L.J. 364, 378 (1952).
2. Karl M. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 783 (1953).
3. Georg Szalai, Google Chairman Eric Schmidt: “The Internet Will Disappear,”
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/googlechairman-eric-schmidt-internet-765989 [https://perma.cc/Z25Y-NUCL].
4. Some states’ versions of Article 9 are “nonuniform,” but the deviations are
relatively minor. See, e.g., 4 JAMES J. WHITE ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 31:41,
31:32 & n.8, 32:18 & n.3, 34:17 & n.3 (6th ed. 2015) (discussing nonuniform state
amendments).
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lauded as “the most successful commercial statute ever.” 5
Article 9 relies upon the central notion of a “security interest”
that a creditor obtains in a debtor’s collateral by agreement. 6 A
security interest can be obtained in almost every sort of personal
property. Once it is “perfected,” the security interest gives the
secured creditor rights in the collateral, not just against the debtor
but also against most subsequent lenders or buyers of the
property. Under Article 9, a secured creditor’s rights against
collateral are generally perfected by virtue of a filing, called a
“financing statement,” made in a public office in the state of the
debtor’s location. A financing statement is indexed under the
debtor’s name and location and theoretically puts other creditors
on notice of the security interest encumbering one or more items
or classes of collateral identified in the statement. 7
Although it arises from a transaction between a creditor and
a debtor, a security interest is a relationship between a creditor
and an item of property. Conceptually, the key feature of
perfection is that it announces the creditor’s claim on that item to
third parties. Yet Article 9’s filing system focuses on the creditor’s
relationship with the debtor, out of perceived practical necessity.
This Article argues this is no longer necessary, thanks to the
availability of technologies that can permit direct identification of
collateral itself.
As it stands, Article 9 remains complicated and inefficient in
numerous respects, 8 due in no small part to the deep structural
flaw of permitting financing statements announcing a security
interest to be filed and discovered only when indexed under the
debtor’s name and in the debtor’s state. 9 This structure
immediately raises questions: Which forms of a debtor’s name
suffice for a filing to be valid? How can a party be certain of the
actual location or identity of a business entity doing business in
state A, which might be incorporated under an identical name in
states B or C? What about when debtors change locations or
P5F

P6F

P

P7F

P8F

P

P9F

P

5. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2021 (1994); see also
Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture,
and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 571 (1998) (“Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code . . . is, by all accounts, the crowning achievement of the UCC
project . . . .”).
6. See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (discussing this and other means of
“perfection”).
8. See Section II.A.2.
9. See infra notes 46–55 and accompanying text.
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names; or when the collateral leaves the possession of one debtor
and becomes the possession of another? Article 9’s rules attempt
to deal with these contingencies and a multitude of others, 10 but
in the end, the oblique structure of announcing an interest in a
thing (the collateral) through a filing against a person or business
(the debtor) brings inevitable complications.
The law has developed a number of cumbersome workarounds
to make the system function. In addition to the complexities
introduced by the requirement of filing under the debtor’s name
are those arising when collateral is sold. Current secured
transactions law permits a security interest to stretch beyond the
collateral actually described on a creditor’s filings to include
proceeds obtained upon the sale of the original collateral. Under
many circumstances, the regime also permits a security interest
to remain on the original collateral after such a sale. Thus, the
system protects the initial secured creditor at the expense of other
parties dealing with the debtor or purchasing a debtor’s former
property, who may have little feasible means of obtaining notice of
a prior security interest.
These workarounds allocate the losses in instances in which
the theoretical goals of the system are not met; they do not provide
parties with notice, help protect their interests, or set sound
commercial expectations. They prevent the efficient and reliable
granting of security interests, which the system purports to
promote. Unsurprisingly, in light of these complications, many
participants in the commercial system fail to protect their
interests or to engage in otherwise desirable transactions. Some
deem the burdens and uncertainties of the filing system not to be
worth the candle. Others are ignorant of the law’s rather arcane
approach to the many difficult questions that the design of the
system provokes. Either way, Article 9 imposes costly
inefficiencies on commerce and finance. 11 Some lenders are more
reluctant to lend against collateral than they would be if the
system provided them with better means of attaining and
protecting their perfection; some are taken advantage of by the
false certainty promoted by Article 9’s apparent—but not actual—
coherence and reliability, and thus suffer needless losses.
Article 9’s weaknesses are well known, but they have been
P10F

P1F

P

P

10. See infra Sections II.A.1–2.
11. As noted in one of the epigraphs to this Article, in explaining the motivation for
the UCC, Karl Llewellyn expressed a desire to end “the unnecessary tax on . . . business
that legal uncertainty now imposes.” Llewellyn, supra note 2.
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considered necessary evils, accepted because no better approaches
were available. This Article proposes a better approach—one that
ends the filing system’s detour through the debtor’s name and
location and trims away the tangle of inefficient workarounds,
including those related to proceeds of sales of collateral. The
Article describes two “disruptive” 12 technologies that can and
should bring a radical shift in secured transactions: “Internet of
Things” (IoT) technologies and geolocation technologies.
Importantly, businesses have widely adopted these technologies
already, but their potential to transform commercial law has not
been recognized. This Article proposes to develop a new secured
transactions filing regime based on these emerging uses of
technology.
Under the proposed regime, readily available IoT and
geolocation technologies would furnish the means for creditors to
provide clearer notice of security interests in collateral and
establish more reliable claims in that collateral. The proposed
regime would require creditors to stake their claims in collateral
directly—by means of public “smart” maps or by individual
electronic tags that facilitate identification of security interests in
items of collateral. This simplification would eliminate the need
for numerous arcane, inefficient, or inequitable features of the
current regime.
To be clear, the proposed changes would be almost entirely in
the law and not in business practices. Secured transactions law
would not be embarking on some quixotic quest to convince
businesses to adopt unknown new technologies. To the contrary, it
would be accommodating the ways in which businesses already
widely use these technologies—including to identify, track, and
monitor their property (including their collateral). Because these
technologies are widely adopted and becoming ever more
pervasive, the costs of transitioning to a new legal regime would
not be a significant burden for most commercial actors, and likely
would be outweighed by the benefits of such a change. 13
P12F

P

P13F

12. On “disruptive” technologies, see Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen,
Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43. Law
scholars have invoked the idea when looking for ways to regulate innovation. See, e.g., Chris
Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977
(2015) (discussing regulatory approaches to disruptive financial technologies); Wulf A. Kaal
& Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation—from Facts to Data, 57
JURIMETRICS J. 169, 177 (2017) (proposing data-based regulatory model for disruptive
innovation). What has drawn less attention in the legal scholarship, but is central to this
Article, is how disruptive innovations may “disrupt” entire bodies of law, such as Article 9.
13. The challenge of adoption that might be faced by commercially or technologically
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In general outline, the proposal is as follows: a creditor taking
a security interest in a particular item 14 of collateral would perfect
that interest by one of two mechanisms. To use the first
mechanism, the creditor (or its agent) would mark the collateral
with an electronic tag or other readable label or device, containing
the name and contact information of the secured creditor and an
ID number generated automatically from an online interface
hosted at the UCC filing office of the state where the collateral is
located. Once the number is assigned and the creditor’s name and
contact information registered, the interest would be perfected. If
the IoT-tagged collateral is moved or sold, the perfected interest
would survive, because perfection is not linked to the debtor.
Anywhere that collateral is encountered, subsequent searchers
(such as potential lenders) could scan it with readily available
technology (such as that included on most smartphones) and check
online UCC databases to discover security interests. The later
creditor would be subordinate to the prior creditor—unless the
unique tag had been damaged or removed from the object (tags
could be designed to stop transmitting if tampered with). In such
a case, after the passage of a short grace period, the prior creditor
would lose to other creditors because it is best positioned to
monitor its collateral and protect against such an eventuality.
Monitoring costs should be minimal, given the power of IoT
technologies to provide automatic, real-time updates from afar
concerning relevant characteristics of collateral. IoT technologies
are regularly used, for example, to monitor remotely the location
of a shipping container or the temperature or humidity of a
warehouse. 15 The technology is expected to expand even more in
coming years. The law would merely be looking to these existing
business practices and giving force to them. 16
The most familiar IoT technology is radio frequency
identification (RFID), which uses electromagnetic fields (radio
waves) to identify and track objects by virtue of “tags” that consist
of a tiny circuit and embedded antenna and that are attached to
P14F

P15F

P

P

P16F

unsophisticated individuals and small businesses is discussed infra Section V.G.
14. Intangibles are discussed infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text; the proposal
is limited to tangible property and would leave the systems dealing with intangible property
intact.
15. See JAMES MACAULAY ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS IN LOGISTICS 16 (2015),
https://delivering-tomorrow.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/DHLTrendReport_Internet_
of_things.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5T3-M72H]; see also infra note 78.
16. See infra Section II.B (comparing need for monitoring under current Article 9
with the proposed system).
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objects. 17 This technology is already ubiquitous. Retailers use
RFID to identify goods received from suppliers and then purchased
by consumers; pharmacists use RFID to weed out counterfeits and
verify the authenticity of medications; and employers use RFID on
security badges. RFID is inexpensive, and its costs are expected to
diminish even further in the future. 18 And this is only one of a
number of existing technologies, which are varied in capabilities
and cost and can be customized to an astonishing variety of
business uses.
This mechanism of perfection mimics, in some ways, the
system already in place for items such as airplanes and cars, which
are assigned unique identifiers by which security interests can be
perfected. 19 Identification of items of collateral has long been
known to make sense in theory, but until now, it was impracticable
for most pieces of collateral, which were not expensive enough to
merit the treatment that valuable items such as cars or airplanes
received. This proposal is a response to the development of cheap
and reliable technology allowing for the tagging of individual
items—technology that did not exist at the time of the UCC’s
drafting.
The second method of perfection would involve geolocation
technology (such as that underlying GPS navigation). 20 A creditor
could log in to a publicly maintained interactive map, navigate and
click to identify the location of its collateral, and then provide its
name and a description of the collateral (broad or narrow as suited
to the individual situation). The security interest would then be
perfected as to any described collateral within that location.
Subsequent searchers could easily check the map and ascertain
whether a geolocated interest had been claimed and inquire
further if necessary. Geolocation would work well with collateral
that typically remains in one place (e.g., large equipment), as well
as with locations where there are many items of collateral that
turn over frequently (e.g., warehouses, factories, and stores)—and
thus where a creditor might determine that tagging each item of
collateral individually is not worthwhile. With this simple method,
a creditor could gain perfection in, for instance, each new batch of
P17F

P

P18F

P19F

P

P

P20F

P

17. See infra notes 99–100.
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing technology used in
motor vehicle and aircraft industries). In part due to imperfect technologies and
nonuniform legal regimes, the system of car titling has been subject to critique and might
be another area where a system such as that proposed here could be helpful. I hope to
address that issue in future work.
20. For a discussion on geophysical technology, see infra notes 107–15 and
accompanying text.
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inventory that arrived in a warehouse or to a given retail location.
The creditor would be tasked with monitoring collateral because if
the collateral were to be moved outside of the protected area
without authorization, the creditor would have only a short grace
period to detect the move, locate the collateral, and assert a claim
against it. Again, due to recent advances, monitoring could be
accomplished remotely, with readily available, inexpensive, and
largely automated technology.
By directly connecting creditors with their collateral, and by
giving notice based on individual tagging or identification of the
location of collateral, the proposed system would lower Article 9
compliance costs and diminish the number of defective filings. It
would also permit the removal of numerous problematic laws such
as those protecting “proceeds.” 21 The revised system would provide
lenders more certainty and at the same time permit debtors to
carve out more precisely the property they wish to subject to
security interests (all of which, in turn, would presumably improve
financial markets and foster commerce). Undeniably, the proposed
system would affect the existing Article 9 in profound ways, some
of which might unsettle current participants. All of these effects
deserve careful consideration before implementation. But it
cannot be ignored that some current practices—such as the
dominant, routine use of “all assets of the debtor” as collateral 22—
might, in fact, be consequences of the compromises of the existing
Article 9. Experimenting with more finely tuned legal approaches
might lead to new, better practices.
In addition to these practical benefits, the proposal would put
secured transactions on a sounder theoretical basis and fulfill the
UCC’s broader normative goals in two important ways. First, the
proposed system would more closely align secured transactions
doctrine with actual commercial practices. The UCC was born out
of the legal realist movement 23 as part of an effort to shape
commercial law around business realities and the actual practice
P21F

P

P2F

P23F

P

P

21. For a discussion of how this proposed change, which, given the extremely broad
protection currently given to proceeds, might be the most disruptive of all, in some ways, to
the UCC, see infra Section II.A.2.b (describing current proceeds regime) and infra Section
IV.A (describing proposed regime).
22. See infra Section V.B (discussing “all-asset” lending).
23. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
270–340 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the “Genesis of the Uniform Commercial Code” and the
“Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code” in the context of legal realism); Allen R.
Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform
Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 339–45 (1995) (outlining the intellectual
and societal underpinnings of Llewellyn’s “Realist” approach).
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of commerce. 24 This proposal moves the law away from the
increasingly archaic step of filing against the debtor’s name and in
the debtor’s location toward the realities of how modern
commercial actors actually protect interests in property, i.e., by
monitoring that property directly. 25 Second, when compared with
the debtor-centered system, the proposed system makes more
conceptual sense. The proposal comports with the underlying
notion of a security interest—which is a relationship between a
creditor and its collateral—as well as with the stated purpose of
the requirement of perfection—to inform third parties that a given
piece of property is encumbered with a security interest. The
proposed system requires creditors to make claims on collateral
directly, through identification on a tag or by its location. The
system would no longer require the detour through the debtor’s
name and location, which has been the source of much mischief in
the law, and which is needless and confusing in light of the
underlying relationship between creditor and collateral that we
call a security interest.
This Article’s proposal is also a unique contribution to the
growing body of scholarly work exploring the possibilities of IoT
and related technologies for law and policy. 26 While
technologically savvy commercial lawyers have floated useful
P24F

P

P25F

P

P26F

P

24. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 631 (1975) (surveying its history and describing the purpose of
the UCC as removing “statute and case law debris from the field so that commercial law
could follow the natural flow of commerce”); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of
Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 492 (1987) (noting
“[UCC chief architect Karl Llewellyn’s] commitment to merchant reality” as one of the two
“essential themes of Llewellyn’s vision [for what became the UCC]”). Wiseman notes that,
“[a]s a realist, Llewellyn viewed law as a means to social ends and recognized the need to
reexamine the law constantly to ensure that it fit the society it claimed to serve.” Id. at 493.
25. As Ronald Mann has noted, “it is too simplistic to treat the codification of
commercial law as a codification of the norms reflected in everyday business practices,” and
yet, “policymakers who want to affect the tenor of commercial life must work to develop
rules that account for the legitimate needs reflected in the reality of commercial
transactions.” Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2225, 2272 (1999). This Article is a call to commercial law policymakers to “develop
rules that account for” new technologies and move the law away from those technologies
that have rendered the law unnecessarily burdensome.
26. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 30–79 (2018) [hereinafter RADICAL
MARKETS]; Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
949, 951–54 (2013) (proposing for virtual “no trespassing” signs to be “posted” and
accessible remotely via GPS devices and smart maps to hunters or recreationists); Eric A.
Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
51, 54 (2017) (proposing a new system of property ownership, taxation, and transfer based
in part on a technologically enabled, universal registry of all property).
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proposals for revising Article 9, 27 none so far has looked to IoT
technologies as a way of taking on the debtor-indexed filing
system—even though this lumbering system is one of the biggest
elephants in the secured transactions room. Even those who seek
to reform the system have not found a way to remove it
altogether. 28 This Article provides such a proposal.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the problems
with the existing Article 9 system. Part III provides an overview
of potentially “disruptive” advancements in two areas, in IoT
technologies and in geolocation technologies. Part IV considers the
strengths and weaknesses of potential regimes based on each of
these technologies and proposes a hybrid perfection regime that
would combine the best features of each. Part V considers potential
hindrances to the proposal’s implementation and functioning.
Although it acknowledges how disruptive the proposed changes
are and notes some ways in which the proposal could be modified
to accommodate some existing practices (such as “all-asset”
lending), it argues that the time has come for this tectonic shift to
collateral-based identification, a shift that will benefit all
stakeholders in the secured transactions regime. Part VI
concludes.
P27F

P28F

P

P

27. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System:
Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 15–17
(Summer 1992); Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 402–03,
417–21 (2017) (proposing Article 9 revision to permit use of blockchain technology in
maintaining financing statement filing system). Notably, outside of the Article 9 arena,
scholars have been usefully exploring other ways in which technologies such as the IoT and
“smart contracts” will affect commercial law. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett,
Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2017) (noting that “[u]biquitous monitoring
technologies allow parties to agree to instantaneous verification of compliance (or lack
thereof) with a micro-directive [in automated or algorithmically driven “smart contracts”]
and, thus, reduce the cost of enforcing contingent contracts”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting
in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV.
839 (2016) (discussing inadequacy of contract law, including Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, in light of the rise of the IoT); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Hybrid Transactions and
the INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017)
(discussing how Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code should treat “hybrid”
transactions involving both software, services, and goods, particularly with respect to
networked devices).
28. Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance
Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 455–74 (2005) (identifying numerous defects with the
filing system following a recent major round of amendments); LoPucki, supra note 27, at
6–15 (providing detailed critique); Gerald T. McLaughlin, “Seek but You May Not Find”:
Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 954 (1985) (critiquing the filing
system); Reyes, supra note 27, at 402–03 (cataloguing problems with the filing system). The
filing system would only be removed as to tangible property under my proposal, although
much law governing intangibles would be simplified as well. See infra notes 133–38 and
accompanying text.
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II. THE EXISTING SYSTEM
A. The Current Secured Transactions Regime
1. How the System Is Supposed to Work and Why. While its
details are complicated, the core features of the Article 9 system
are simple, even elegant. A summary can be provided as follows.
A security interest is a creditor’s legally recognized claim on some
item of property. 29 Once a security interest has been granted by a
debtor and certain other requirements have been met, the security
interest attaches, meaning it is valid and enforceable as between
the debtor and creditor. 30 Even if the collateral remains in the
debtor’s possession and the debtor keeps using it, the property
remains as collateral for the obligation owed to the creditor. The
crucial, indispensable feature of an Article 9 security interest is
that it allows the creditor to look to the collateral for collection,
regardless of whether the debtor is uncooperative or has vanished.
If the debtor fails to pay, the creditor can seize the collateral—
often without judicial process—and sell it to cover the debt that is
owed. 31
Commonly, parties agree for a security interest to “float” over
not just the original collateral—that is, what was collateral at the
time of attachment—but also over after-acquired collateral. 32 This
is convenient, for instance, for inventory, which frequently turns
over. One agreement can provide for many shipments rather than
forcing the parties to enter into repeated agreements for each new
delivery of collateral.
Attachment is not enough, however, because it is usually only
valid as between the creditor and debtor. A debtor may have other
creditors who might also have security interests in the same
collateral, or who might try to seize the collateral through a
collections process such as garnishment or levy. For one creditor
to supersede others—to take priority over them with respect to
particular collateral—the creditor generally must take further
steps, to perfect that interest. 33 Usually, perfection is accomplished
with the step of making a short, electronic filing, called a financing
29F

30F

31F

P32F

P3F

P

P

29. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
30. Id. § 9-203(a)–(b) (requirements of attachment).
31. See id. § 9-609 (creditor can seize collateral after default if done “without breach
of the peace”); id. § 9-610 (creditor can sell collateral); id. § 9-615 (sale proceeds used to pay
off debt, and excess returned to debtor).
32. Id. § 9-204 (after-acquired property); id. cmt. 2.
33. Id. § 9-308(a) (defining perfection).
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statement, in an office designated by the Secretary of State of the
debtor’s state of residence or incorporation. 34 The financing
statement provides the debtor’s name and address, the secured
creditor’s name and address, and a description of the collateral,
which can be as general as “all assets.” 35 Once filed (usually
electronically), the financing statement is indexed by the debtor’s
name, and after that point, in most states, a creditor or other
inquirer can run an online search using the debtor’s name to find
any given financing statement. 36
Usually, the first creditor to file a financing statement will
have priority as to collateral covered by that statement—even if,
at the time of filing, the security interest has not actually attached,
or if a second creditor’s interest attaches first. 37 The theory is that
the financing statement proclaims the secured creditor’s interest
in the collateral, thus putting later creditors on notice that they
may not be first in line.
Imagine that Creditor A has a perfected security interest with
priority over an interest of Creditor B. If Debtor defaults on
payments to Creditor A, Creditor A has the right to seize the
collateral and auction it off to cover what it is owed by Debtor,
notwithstanding Creditor B’s competing interest. For this reason,
Creditor A is, in theory, able to deal with Debtor on more favorable
terms, in light of its certainty regarding the collectability of its
debt given its superior interest in the collateral. By contrast,
Creditor B would be left only with leftover proceeds from the
auction (if any), after Creditor A has been paid in full. 38
Accordingly, if Creditor B searches the records and discovers a
financing statement of Creditor A, it may refuse to lend to Debtor,
charge Debtor a higher interest rate, or demand more collateral to
compensate for the increased risk that if Debtor defaults on the
P34F

P35F

P

P

P36F

P37F

P

P38F

P

34. Id. § 9-310(a); 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 31:27 (“Perfection by filing is by far
the most common method of perfecting a security interest under Article 9. . . . We suspect
that for more than 90% of the universe, perfection occurs by some form of filing of a
document, which the [UCC] calls a ‘financing statement’ . . . .”).
35. U.C.C. § 9-108; id. cmt. 2 (explaining that a financing statement sufficiently
indicates collateral with the phrase “covers all assets or all personal property,” a phrase
that would not be sufficient indication in a security agreement).
36. See, e.g., Revised Article 9 UCC Search, KY. SECRETARY OF ST. ONLINE SERVS.,
https://app.sos.ky.gov/ftucc/(S(iof21xjbrgxalmjilhet0k34))/search.aspx [https://perma.cc/6G
89-PNL9] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
37. Notably, it is the first creditor to file such a statement whose security interest
will have priority, not the first creditor to have perfected the interest. The filing can be (and
often is) made prior to attachment and in essence preserves the creditor’s “place in line” if
and when it perfects. U.C.C. § 9-322(a); 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 33:3.
38. U.C.C. § 9-615(d).
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debt, the collateral’s value to Creditor B will be diminished (due to
Creditor A’s continued, higher priority rights in it).
Thus, the awarding of priority to Creditor A is thought to be
justified by Creditor B’s opportunity to adjust the terms of any
credit it extends to Debtor in light of its notice of Creditor A’s prior
interest. 39 Creditor B is deemed to have dealt with Debtor on terms
that reflected Creditor A’s prior interest. The importance that
Article 9 places on notice to creditors is connected to the notion,
which has a centuries-long historical pedigree, that inequity and
fraud may be perpetrated if “secret liens” are granted legal
validity—in other words, if the apparent or ostensible owner of
property has, without public notice, transferred property out of the
grasp of unsuspecting creditors. 40 The principle dates back, at
least, to the English Twyne’s Case of 1601. 41 The notice aspect of
the modern Article 9 system is structured to promote commerce by
maximizing transferability of interests in property while assuring
participants in the system that their expectations and interests
will not be undermined by secret liens or other deceptive devices.
The above summarizes the basic structure and rationale of
the existing secured transactions system as embodied in Article 9
of the UCC. The notion of a security interest and of perfection via
a brief financing statement filed in a central location was
revolutionary at the time of the UCC’s development in the 1950s
and ’60s. 42 The system has been attacked—and defended—on
normative bases, 43 but its rudiments have remained unchanged
P39F

P

P40F

P

P41F

P42F

P

P

P43F

P

39. Some creditors have no opportunity to benefit from notice or adjust credit terms.
Tort creditors, for instance. Lack of consideration of such creditors has been criticized. See
infra note 154.
40. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53–54 (1983); Lipson, supra note 28, at 424–45.
41. 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810 (Star Chamber 1601); see also Baird, supra note 40, at 53–
54; Lipson, supra note 28, at 437–38.
42. These are the primary reasons that “Article 9 was the most innovative of the
original Code articles . . . .” 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 30:1 (“In pre-Code days, the
lawyer had to work with a variety of security devices, each governed by its own body of law.
. . . The grand innovation of Article 9 in 1962 was the introduction of a single ‘unitary’
security device.”); id. § 31:27 (“Filing of a financing statement as to personal property was
revolutionized by the initial adoption of the [UCC], and later by the widespread use of
electronic data storage. Prior to the Code’s filing system, filing was haphazard and
nonuniform . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 33 (Winter 1951) (providing an early account of
Article 9 by its primary drafter); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the
Uniform Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1105–07, 1110–12 (2002) (providing a
critical and scholarly overview of the substance of the UCC, with a focus on Article 2 and
Article 9, as well as the lawmaking process).
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since the original passage of Article 9. 44
P4F

2. How the System Actually Works and Why. The core concepts
and basic structure of Article 9 are sensible and coherent. Faced
with a welter of convoluted, contradictory, or uncertain state laws
governing the diverse array of secured transactions and claims to
collateral, the drafters of Article 9 fashioned a relatively brief and
conceptually sound statute that despite several rounds of
amendment remains fundamentally intact more than half a
century later. 45 Their work product, Article 9, provides a logical
method of organizing claims to and rights in collateral, based on
the unifying notions of the “security interest” that is “attached”
and then “perfected,” and takes “priority” in the collateral.
But the system is riddled with loopholes, gaps, and
exceptions. As a result, creditors remain unsure of how secure
their interest in collateral really is. There are two general types of
problems with the operation of the current Article 9 system. The
first type arises from difficulties in obtaining or maintaining
perfection. For instance, it might arise due to uncertainty about
how to identify the debtor, about where to file the requisite forms,
or about who actually has rights in the property at a given time.
The second type of problem is more esoteric but highly pertinent
in the actual functioning of the system. This difficulty arises from
the fact that even after a debtor disposes of the collateral, the UCC
permits creditors to maintain certain rights both in the original
collateral and in any proceeds from the sale of that collateral. For
these rights to be exercised, a creditor must “trace” the collateral
and the proceeds to whomever now owns or has other rights in
them—who may well be surprised by the creditor’s assertion of
rights.
The central theme of this section is that the promise of
certainty is not fulfilled because Article 9’s current system of
debtor-based identification is cumbersome and ineffective. It
includes various ornate provisions for maintaining existing
45F

44. Despite the changes to Article 9 over time, the core ideas (collateral, attachment,
etc.) have remained consistent. See generally 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 30:1
(summarizing the history of Article 9); id. § 30:2 (summarizing the basic “definitions and
concepts”).
45. This might be because the fundamental structure is sound, or that the committees
tasked with amendment have been “congenitally conservative.” James J. White, Revising
Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 823, 823 (1993) (noting
“members [of such committees] quickly become focused on revisions and amendments that
any outsider would describe as modest”). White concludes that “[t]o the extent that the
revision of any of the articles of the [UCC] is going to be more than modest, the push must
come from academics or practicing commercial lawyers outside of these committees.” Id.
This Article attempts to “push” just such a “revision” of Article 9.
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interests even where they aren’t really identified and can’t put
another lender on notice. This section probes the nature and
extent of those problems, and the rest of the Article explains how
they can be minimized or eliminated by application of new
technologies.
a. Rights in Original Collateral. The first type of problem
arises when a creditor attempts to obtain and maintain rights in
an item of collateral. Despite several rounds of amendment to try
to make Article 9’s process simpler and more certain, there remain
numerous situations in which such a problem can arise.
The most important pieces of information in a financing
statement, both for initial filing and for later searching, are the
debtor’s name and location. 46 The correct forms of debtors’ names
for financing statements are specified by a combination of uniform
statute and state choice. 47 Location is defined as residence for a
natural person, state of incorporation for a registered
organization, and principal place of business for an unregistered
organization. 48 With narrow exceptions, if a creditor enters an
incorrect debtor’s name in a financing statement, then the
statement will not be valid. 49 On the other hand, if a searcher does
not know the correct debtor’s name, then it may fail to locate a
valid financing statement. The same outcome would result if the
searcher were to search the wrong set of records—for instance,
searching the Delaware records for filings against “Acme, Inc.,”
rather than searching the Connecticut records, which, if this
particular Acme is a Connecticut entity, would be the correct
record to search. 50 Of course, in all of these situations, the “notice”
function of the filing system has failed.
These errors might seem easy to prevent by a knowledgeable
party (although easy to make by a commercially unsophisticated
P46F

P47F

P48F

P

P

P

P49F

P50F

P

P

46. U.C.C. § 9-503(a); see also id. § 9-503 cmt. 2 (“The requirement that a financing
statement provides the debtor’s name is particularly important. Financing statements are
indexed under the name of the debtor, and those who wish to find financing statements
search for them under the debtor’s name.”).
47. Id. § 9-503 (providing alternatives A and B).
48. Id. § 9-307(b), (e).
49. Id. § 9-506; see also id. cmt. 2 (noting that the intent of this section and
section 9-503 is to “balance the interests of filers and searchers”).
50. Id. § 9-503; see also id. cmt. 2 (noting that because “[f]inancing statements are
indexed under the name of the debtor,” the “requirement that a financing statement provide
the debtor’s name is particularly important”). Technically, the issue is whether you even
have the right debtor in mind, whether you know which business entity actually owns the
relevant assets. The practical import is the same regardless of how this uncertainty is
phrased; and the proposal of this Article squarely addresses this uncertainty.
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party). A creditor can obtain the debtor’s correct name from an
authoritative document (for instance, a company’s “public organic
record” 51 or an individual’s current driver’s license) at the time of
a particular filing, and thus be relatively assured, at that moment,
that the interest is perfected as to the particular collateral that is
owned by that debtor. But, such certainty is more apparent than
real. Even if an interest has been duly perfected, maintaining it
can be problematic. A debtor may change its primary residence
without informing the secured creditor, thus requiring the creditor
to re-file in the new state to remain perfected. 52 Or a debtor may
change names without notifying the creditor. 53 Or a debtor may
transfer ownership of the collateral without notifying the
creditor—perhaps to an identically named corporate entity in
another state. 54 And all of these occurrences may be characterized
differently under the UCC depending on whether the debtor and
collateral are still in the same state or whether they have crossed
state lines. 55 Making an accurate filing and maintaining it over
time are not as simple as they appear.
In many ways, assuring priority is often as important as
assuring perfection. Under the idealized version of the system,
priority is assured by a creditor checking the public records to
ascertain that its desired priority is available, and then filing a
financing statement to “save its place in line.” This is how the
notice system is supposed to function.
In fact, assuring priority is difficult and uncertain under
Article 9. For instance, Article 9 provides for perfection not only by
filing but by possession of collateral. 56 The thought here is that
P51F

P

P52F

P53F

P54F

P5F
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P

P

P

P56F
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51. Id. §§ 9-503, 9-102(a)(68).
52. Id. § 9-316(a)(2); see also id. § 9-316 cmt. 2 (noting that “a security interest
perfected under the law of one jurisdiction remains perfected for a fixed period of time . . .
depending on the circumstances[], even though the jurisdiction whose law governs
perfection changes” and arguing the time periods provided “are long enough for a secured
party to discover in most cases that the law of a different jurisdiction governs perfection
and to reperfect”).
53. Because there is no single authoritative form of an individual’s name, and names
can change, debtor names are hard to specify correctly and require numerous filings and
regular monitoring. The same holds for unincorporated entities.
54. U.C.C. § 9-316(a)(2) (“A security interest perfected [in State A] remains perfected
until . . . four months after [debtor moves].”); id. § 9-316(a)(3) (“A security interest perfected
[where the debtor is located] remains perfected until . . . one year after a transfer of
collateral to a person . . . located in another jurisdiction.”). The commentary argues (without
explanation) that the grace periods “are long enough for a secured party to discover [the
change and] reperfect.” Id. § 9-316 cmt. 2; see also id. exs. 1–4 (providing sample exemplary
fact patterns); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. U.C.C. § 9-507(c).
56. Id. § 9-313.
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when a creditor has actually taken possession of the collateral,
such possession effectively gives notice that the creditor has an
interest in the property. In other words, because the debtor does
not even possess the collateral, other creditors are on inquiry
notice, at least, of a competing interest. But the standard for
possession can be met without an inquirer actually getting any
sort of notice. For instance, the person holding the collateral could
be acting as agent or as holder on behalf of the debtor, and that
status need not be ascertainable by any public observation (or even
communicated in answer to a formal inquiry). 57 Thus, even if an
agent of the secured creditor arrives at a warehouse and takes an
accounting of the property on premises, the secured creditor
cannot be certain of the legal possession of the collateral. The
debtor could merely be the apparent owner of the property. If the
warehouse employees have agreed to serve as a competing
creditor’s agents, or even as agents of both the debtor and the
competing creditor, the investigating party may end up
unknowingly “junior” (i.e., of lower priority).
Priority can also be threatened if the goods were “consumer
goods” at the time they were originally purchased. 58 If this is the
case, another creditor’s interest might have been “perfected
automatically” in them (meaning a filing would not be necessary),
without notice of such interest being available to later inquirers. 59
P57F

P

P58F

P

P59F

b. Rights After Disposition of Collateral. Article 9 currently
provides that after disposition—including a sale for fair market
value—of an item of collateral, an existing security interest
generally remains on that collateral. 60 The statute provides a
partial exception for a “buyer in ordinary course of business” of an
60F

57. See id. § 9-313(c) (secured party can take “possession” by virtue of an
“acknowledge[ment]” from the person actually in possession that they hold possession “for
the secured party’s benefit”); id. § 9-313 cmt. 3 (explaining that if possessor is agent of
secured creditor, it is deemed actual possession under principles of agency law, and
subsection (c) is not implicated). These provisions have been sharply criticized. See, e.g.,
Lipson, supra note 28, at 432–35.
58. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23) (defining consumer goods); id. § 9-309(1) (stating that a
purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is perfected when attached); id. § 9320 cmt. 5 (discussing purchase-money security interests with regards to filing).
59. See id. § 9-320 cmt. 5. As the text suggests, this status is triggered by the
purchasing party’s intent at the time of purchase, and thus not objectively verifiable nor
stable over time. And even quite expensive or large items have been deemed eligible for this
status, contrary to the apparent purpose of the law, which is to insulate commercially
unsophisticated buyers of small household items from hidden UCC issues. See LYNN M.
LOPUCKI ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 333–36 (8th ed. 2016)
(discussing large and expensive “consumer goods”).
60. U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).

56 Hous. L. Rev. 965 (2019)

2019

DISRUPTING SECURED TRANSACTIONS

983

item, but even this exception only provides that such a buyer takes
the item free of security interests created by the party selling the
item to that buyer—not any interests created by prior owners of
the collateral. 61
In theory, then, a would-be buyer seeking to ensure a
purchase free and clear of prior encumbrances, or a would-be
creditor seeking a security interest in that item, must investigate
the full, prior ownership history of any personal property to ensure
that it is free of an existing security interest. 62 In practice,
obviously, the burdensome nature of such a search—assuming it
is even possible—is more than what a rational lender or buyer
would be willing to undertake, except perhaps with respect to
exceptionally valuable items of collateral.
An existing security interest also attaches to the money (or
anything else) received in exchange for the original collateral.
Article 9 provides detailed rules concerning proceeds of collateral,
which permit security interests to proliferate far beyond an
original item of collateral. The rule generally provides that if a
creditor has a security interest in one piece of collateral, the
security interest will attach to any proceeds of that collateral. 63
Often, the interest not only attaches to, but remains perfected in,
the proceeds, whether permanently or for a limited time, and thus
can bind unsuspecting third parties. 64
Proceeds are defined broadly to include any piece of property
(tangible or intangible) obtained by the sale or disposition of that
collateral, and even any “rights arising out of collateral” (whatever
that may mean). 65 The protection extends beyond any initial sale
or exchange because proceeds-of-proceeds are subject to the same
protection as the original proceeds. 66 The process continues on and
on, as long as the chain of proceeds can be traced back to the
original collateral.
61F
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61. See id. § 1-201(b)(9) (defining buyer in ordinary course of business); id. § 9-320(a)
(sale to buyer in ordinary course strips off only those security interests “created by the
buyer’s seller”); id. § 9-320 cmts. 3, 6 (providing examples of buyer in ordinary course
exception, the exceptions to this exception, and the exceptions to the exceptions to this
exception).
62. See id. § 9-507(a); id. § 9-507 cmt. 3 (noting that any person searching the
condition of the ownership of a debtor must make inquiry as to the debtor’s source of title
and must search in the name of a former owner if circumstances seem to require it).
63. Id. § 9-315(a)(2).
64. Id. § 9-315(c).
65. Id. § 9-102(a)(64).
66. Id. § 9-102(a)(12) (defining “collateral” as including proceeds of original
collateral); id. § 9-102(a)(64) cmt. 13(c) (clarifying that subsection (a)(12) means that
proceeds-of-proceeds are protected as proceeds).
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Under these rules, a financing statement perfecting an
interest in inventory may have the effect of perfecting an interest
in money, accounts receivable, or even equipment, if rights in such
collateral were acquired upon the disposition of the original
collateral (or any of its proceeds). 67 Disturbingly, these additional
categories of items that would be subject to a security interest need
not be disclosed anywhere on a financing statement. 68
There are some limitations. Under some circumstances,
perfection in proceeds is limited in time, such that if a secured
creditor does not act quickly to remain perfected in the proceeds
by some other means (e.g., a financing statement), the perfection
lapses. 69 Some types of proceeds—for instance, those purchased by
cash that is itself proceeds—do not receive the protection of
automatic perfection. 70 But these limitations merely underscore
the arbitrariness of the existing system. Why should one buyer be
protected because the seller purchased an item with cash proceeds
and another buyer be unprotected because the seller obtained an
item by an in-kind trade involving goods that were proceeds?
P67F
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B. The Problem with Article 9’s Problems—and the Way to a
Solution
Article 9 is rife with opportunities for well-founded
commercial interests to be undermined by events or circumstances
that are unknown to a creditor or that transpire after the creditor
believes it has secured its rights in the collateral. These
opportunities may be exploited in bad faith, as when a debtor
deceives a creditor as to its rights in particular collateral. More
often, problems arise innocently, as when a creditor’s collateral is
disposed of without that creditor’s knowledge or consent, leaving
the creditor to seek protection in the rules concerning proceeds,
67. See id. § 9-102(a)(64) (definition of proceeds); id. § 9-203(f) (providing that a
security interest in collateral extends to proceeds of that collateral); id. § 9-315(c)–(e)
(establishing rules regarding preservation of perfection of security interests). The definition
of proceeds expanded under the 2001 revisions. See LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 59, at 163–
64.
68. This is what Professor Lipson has aptly termed “remote control”: “the unique
power created by Article 9 to assert rights in assets in the hands of parties far removed
from the original debtor, in a transaction that is likely undiscoverable by that remote
party.” Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the Negotiability of
Information, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1333 (2002).
69. U.C.C. § 9-315(c)–(e) (providing for continuation, and lapse, of perfection of
security interests in proceeds, under various circumstances); id. § 9-515(c)–(e) (providing
for lapse of effectiveness of financing statements). On the treatment of proceeds and afteracquired property in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
70. U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 5.

56 Hous. L. Rev. 965 (2019)

2019

DISRUPTING SECURED TRANSACTIONS

985

which in turn impact unsuspecting third parties.
The steps required to obtain extra certainty under Article 9
are burdensome, and for all but the most valuable items, the costs
of certainty are not worth the marginal benefits to most individual
creditors. As a result, numerous UCC rules act more as lossallocation mechanisms rather than guides to actual or potential
practice of creditors. 71 These mechanisms are often arbitrary in
effect and impose a societal cost by significantly undermining
commercial certainty of actors engaged in borrowing or lending.
Article 9’s function as an erratic loss-allocation regime rather
than a practical guide for compliance negatively impacts the entire
commercial law framework. First, it subjects the Article 9 system
to criticism on substantive grounds: the law provides less
predictability ex ante than expected, its results ex post are often
questionable (and subject to uncertainty and splits in legal
authority), and commerce suffers as a result.
Second, it subjects Article 9 to attack on grounds that,
procedurally, the uniform law process by which it has been
developed is inequitable, or simply biased and captured. 72 The
process by which Article 9 is annotated and amended has been
viewed as political rather than technical, dominated by powerful
interests, undermining Article 9’s legitimacy as law. 73 Technocrats
and legal scholars may be entrusted with the power to develop
efficient and equitable rules, but the purportedly neutral,
expertise-driven process lacks legitimacy when it wields power
over the distributive question—not particularly susceptible to
technical analysis—of how losses should be allocated across a wide
swathe of commercial activities including those involving
consumers. Criticisms of the uniform law process, by which
P71F
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71. See LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 59, at 339, 394 (“In circumstances where potential
losses are not worth the effort necessary to avoid them, the [UCC Art. 9] rules simply
allocate those losses to the filers or searchers.”); see also LoPucki, supra note 27, at 14–15.
72. Scholarship on the uniform law process, including Article 9’s drafting and
amendment, is extensive. See, e.g., David Frisch & Peter A. Alces, On the U.C.C. Revision
Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217, 1219–20 (1996); Steven L.
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9?:
Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1367 (1999) (describing process
from inside perspective); Janger, supra note 5, at 618 (identifying problematic aspects of
revision process); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1816–22
(1994) (providing public choice analysis). For this Article, the key point is that if rather
than providing loss-allocation rules in a zero-sum game, Article 9 were to provide feasible
and reliable means of fulfilling commercial expectations, the stakes of the amendment
process may be lower.
73. This erosion of Article 9’s legitimacy could lead to more states passing nonuniform
amendments to the law or to more judges or lawmakers putting their “thumbs on the scale”
in favor of consumer, bankruptcy, or real estate law when they conflict with the UCC.
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amendments to Article 9 are proposed and by which its text is
formally annotated, have bite because the distributive impact of
Article 9 is so pronounced, more than might be supposed from its
posture as a neutral source of the rules of the game.
All of this would be merely academic, however, without
changes in technology providing the hope of another way to do
things. Hitherto, there was little that could be done, even by those
who saw this situation clearly. Now, technologies have changed
the means by which commercial actors transfer and monitor
interests in collateral, allowing them to directly and remotely
track the location and status of the property to which they have
claims. 74 As a result, the step of filing a financing statement
against the debtor’s name and in the debtor’s location seems a
bureaucratic hassle using an archaic tool of limited effectiveness.
The UCC emerged from legal realism, with a commitment to shape
commercial law around the actual practice of commerce. 75
Particularly in light of that underlying commitment, Article 9’s
legal rules are ripe for the same technological disruption that has
been working its way through the world of business and finance.
In other words, Article 9’s rules were defensible based on the
limitations of the world in which it was drafted. The Article 9
regime is a historical artifact of an era when both collateralspecific identification and cheap, automated, ongoing monitoring
of collateral were not feasible. In light of technological change,
which has largely removed those limitations, the rules are
needlessly cumbersome and ripe for substantial revision. Part III
explores the new technologies that can and should support this
change. The changes ultimately proposed would benefit
commercial law in two major ways: they would align Article 9 more
closely with modern commercial practices, and they would rebuild
its legitimacy by making it less of a tangle of distributively
consequential but difficult-to-defend loss-allocation rules and
more of a feasible and functional guide to facilitating reliable
financing and obtaining commercial certainty.
P74F

P

P75F

P

III. TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES
There are at least two areas of technology that could revamp
the secured transactions system: (1) technologies using tags that
can communicate remotely and (2) technologies related to
74. See generally Luigi Atzori et al., The Internet of Things: A Survey, 54 COMPUTER
NETWORKS 2787, 2787 (2010) (illustrating new technologies that will permit commercial
actors to monitor collateral).
75. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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geolocation. This section considers the potential of each area of
technology to transform the secured transactions system.
Each technology faces limits that would likely prevent it—at
least on its own—from serving as the basis of a new system.
However, a hybrid regime is possible, one that combines the
strengths of both technologies and eliminates most of their weak
points.
A. “Internet of Things” Technology
A security interest is a relationship between a creditor and an
item of collateral. 76 Yet security interests are indexed by reference
to the debtor’s name, rather than the collateral. This indirect
system of reference is a fundamental problem with the secured
transactions system. As shown in the previous section, Article 9
has been unable to work around this indirectness problem.
Technology now permits a relationship to be established
directly with items of collateral. Even on a mass scale, items can
be inexpensively identified and remotely monitored from afar. The
relevant technologies are generally discussed under the rubric of
the Internet of Things. 77 The IoT is the incorporation of items from
vacuum cleaners to shipping crates into computer networks via
technologically enabled sensors, tags, and devices. 78 One trillion
P76F

P

P7F

P

P78F

P

76. See supra Section II.A.1.
77. See, e.g., Luigi Atzori et al., supra note 68, at 2787 (“The basic idea of this concept
is the pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects – such as RadioFrequency IDentification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc. – which,
through unique addressing schemes, are able to interact with each other and cooperate with
their neighbors to reach common goals.”); Eleanora Borgia, The Internet of Things Vision:
Key Features, Applications and Open Issues, 54 COMPUTER COMM. 1, 1 (2014) (“IoT refers
to an emerging paradigm consisting of a continuum of uniquely addressable things
communicating one another to form a worldwide dynamic network.”); In Lee & Kyoochun
Lee, The Internet of Things (IoT): Applications, Investments, and Challenges for Enterprises,
58 BUS. HORIZONS 431, 431 (2015) (“The IoT is recognized as one of the most important
areas of future technology . . . .”); Felix Wortmann & Kristina Flüchter, Internet of Things:
Technology & Value Added, 57 BUS. INFO. SYS. ENGINEERING 221, 221 (2015) (“[E]stimates
currently suggest that the IoT could grow into a market worth $7.1 trillion by 2020.”).
78. See, e.g., Matthew Lacey et al., Shipping Smarter: IoT Opportunities in Transport
and Logistics 2 (Deloitte Univ. Press, 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insight
s/us/articles/iot-in-shipping-industry/DUP1271_IoT_Transportation-and-Logistics_MAST
ER.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG6Q-HYRE] (“[C]ompanies in this sector have embraced the
suite of data-driven technologies dubbed the Internet of Things (IoT) in diverse settings,
from maritime and aviation freight to warehousing to package delivery.”). Powerful devices
are readily available on an off-the-rack basis. See, e.g., Shipping Container Management
Solutions, AT&T BUS., https://www.business.att.com/solutions/service/internet-of-things/a
ssetmanagement/shipping-container-trailers.html [https://perma.cc/PEN7-Y6JC] (last
visited Apr. 16, 2019) (offering “[m]onitoring devices attached to your containers or trailers
[that] gather data from an array of sensors that track the condition of the container and
contents over the duration of its trip,” and noting that “[t]he collected data is sent to the
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devices are estimated to be networked by 2025. 79 This huge
networking effort is perhaps more aptly called the “Internet of
Everything.” 80 Innovations have made technologies for detecting
and monitoring goods, payments, and places much cheaper and
more accurate, and these innovations have transformed
commerce—even if that change is not yet reflected in the law.
High-profile examples of the IoT are in-home devices such as
Amazon’s Echo and Google’s Home, which require a user only to
speak appropriate commands to monitor and control IoT-enabled
devices throughout the home to: adjust the thermostat, lock the
doors, print an e-mail, order more dish soap, play music, or
converse with someone at the door. 81
Although they garner less media attention, business
applications of the IoT are more ubiquitous and more economically
important than consumer applications. 82 Merchants have adopted
P79F

P80F

P

P

P81F

P82F

P

cloud for viewing from an application that provides alerts and notifications, customizable
to support the needs of your business”); The Internet of Things: The Future of Consumer
Adoption, ACCENTURE INTERACTIVE: POINT OF VIEW SERIES (2014), https://www.accentur
e.com/t20150624T211456__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/ Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom/D
ocuments/Global/PDF/Technology_9/Accenture-Internet-Things.pdf [https://perma.cc/52N
G-89HF] (predicting eventual smart vacuum cleaner market share of 40%).
79. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 (2014) (citing this
estimate).
80. Id. at 89 n.14 (discussing the origin and aptness of this phrase).
81. See Grant Clauser, Amazon Echo vs. Google Home: Which Voice Controlled
Speaker Is Best for You?, WIRECUTTER, https://thewirecutter.com/reviews/amazon-echo-vsgoogle-home/ [https://perma.cc/X4NL-25LW] (last updated Jan. 22, 2019) (describing
capabilities of the devices as “digital assistants” by which they control “smart home” devices
such as thermostats, speakers, doorbells, and lights). On various other consumer
functionalities of IoT devices, see, for example, Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald,
Appliance Science: The Internet of Toasters (and Other Things), CNET NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.cnet.com/news/appliance-science-the-internet-of-toasters-and-other-things/
[https://perma.cc/3U9P-SRBC?type=image] (noting that existing technologies already
include “washing machines and dryers from Whirlpool and others that ping your cell phone
when they are done and also know when electricity is cheapest (to keep down the cost of
the wash)”); Nick Wingfield, With Meld, Another Step Toward the Internet of Tasty Things,
N.Y. TIMES BITS (Apr. 7, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/withmeld-another-step-toward-the-internet-of-tasty-things/ (describing device and application
that aids food preparation by giving real-time sensor-based monitoring of dishes, and
automated control of stove); Parija Kavilanz, ‘Connected’ Babies = More Sleep for You, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 17, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/16/smallbusiness/mimo-wearablebaby-monitor/index.html [https://perma.cc/6KW3-SZX3] (describing baby monitoring
technologies such as sensor-embedded onesies that transmit information to a smartphone
application).
82. James Manyika et al., Unlocking the Potential of the Internet of Things,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (June 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digita
l-mckinsey/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-the-value-of-digitizing-the-physical-world
[https://perma.cc/4P6U-FCS9] (“Business-to-business applications [of the IoT] will probably
capture more value—nearly 70 percent of it—than consumer uses, although consumer
applications, such as fitness monitors and self-driving cars, attract the most
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technologies such as RFID to track millions of objects shipped
great distances (and moved around stores and warehouses)
remotely 83; the IoT generates vast amounts of everyday data
allowing firms to tailor goods and services (and advertising) to
newly revealed consumer behaviors; and businesses are
integrating blockchain and “smart contract” technologies with the
IoT to ease the administrative risks and costs of large-volume,
long-distance shipping. Farm equipment is now embedded with
IoT technology to aid automation, generate data for the
manufacturer and for users, and permit more efficiently tailored
processes for tasks like planting seeds or spreading fertilizer by
analyzing soil conditions in real time. 84 The movement of freight
across borders, over land and seas, and through ports is monitored
remotely by both government authorities and private companies
to diminish paperwork burdens and increase security. 85 Airlines
and plane manufacturers use sensors to speedily and reliably log
airplane parts, tools, and safety devices at airport construction
and maintenance facilities and on airplanes themselves. 86 Fleets
of work vehicles are remotely tracked through onboard telematics,
and the data analyzed, to encourage cautious and lawful driving,
keep workers on task, and prevent theft. 87 Supply chain
P83F

P

P84F

P

P85F

P

P86F

P87F

P

P

attention . . . .”).
83. See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text (describing RFID technology and
applications).
84. See, e.g., Alex Fitzpatrick, Hand Me That Wrench: Farmers and Apple Fight Over
the Toolbox, TIME, July 3, 2017, at 20–21 (mentioning self-driving tractors equipped with
software and GPS). This has led to a battle over farmers’ right to repair or modify their
equipment. See, e.g., Grant Gerlock, Farmers Look for Ways to Circumvent Tractor Software
Locks, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsi
dered/2017/04/09/523024776/farmers-look-for-ways-to-circumvent-tractor-software-locks
[https://perma.cc/FG6W-5TXJ]. I am grateful to my former student Nicholas Oleson for
bringing this to my attention.
85. See supra note 78 (detailing the wide adoption of IoT technologies for tracking
and monitoring in the shipping industry).
86. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖENBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 146 (2013) (noting
that “aircraft engine-maker Rolls-Royce . . . transformed its business over the past decade
by analyzing the data from its products, not just building them,” that it “continuously
monitors the performance of more than 3,700 jet engines worldwide to spot problems before
breakdowns occur,” and that it has “used data to help turn a manufacturing business into”
a service-focused one); INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, GUIDANCE ON INTRODUCING RADIO
FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) INTO AIRLINE MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS 4–12 (May
2013),
https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2476.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BNS4-B9LQ]
(describing technology and uses in airline industry); cf. Martha C. White, Investing in Tech
to Tackle an Awful Annoyance: Lost Luggage, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2017, at B4 (“[N]ew bag
tags are embedded with RFID chips . . . which means the location of bags is tracked and
electronically crosschecked against a database to make sure that they are in the right place
at the right time.”).
87. The technology is generally termed “telematics.” See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF
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management has been transformed by IoT technologies, with more
change on the horizon; 88 for example, Amazon’s vast warehouses
are reliant upon algorithms to maximize efficient and accurate
movement of both people and items. 89 In fact, decades before,
Walmart attained dominance by superior efficiency in supply
chain and inventory management, in part due to its extensive
adoption of what can be thought of as proto-IoT technologies, such
as barcodes and RFID tags. 90 Bar codes are familiar to all
P8F

P

P89F

P90F

P

P

MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY
167–71 (2016); MAYER-SCHÖENBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 86, at 89 (describing how UPS
uses telematics to monitor employees, predict repair needs, and optimize delivery routes
for length, speed, and safety; noting that UPS cut thirty million miles off of drivers’ routes
using these systems in 2011); id. at 135 (noting that the company Inrix “compiles real-time
geo-location data from 100 million vehicles in North America and Europe”); SEBASTIAN
PFEIFLE ET AL., FLEET LEASING & MANAGEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA: KEY ENABLER FOR THE
FUTURE OF MOBILITY 36–37 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Doc
uments/consumer-industrial-products/Deloitte_Fleet-leasing-and-management-in-NorthAmerica.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8F2-TWP2] (“Today about 40-45 percent of all US fleet
vehicles are already equipped with a telematics device.”); INTEL CORP., INTELLIGENT FLEET
MANAGEMENT 3–4 (2015), https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/document
s/white-papers/atom-e3800-intelligent-fleet-management-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUE
2-LGS9] (explaining fleet management system structure and providing results of case
studies showing significantly safer and more fuel-efficient driving after system
implementation); Andy Lundin, Telematics Evolution Pushes Forward for Fleets,
AUTOMOTIVE FLEET (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.automotive-fleet.com/279628/telematicsevolution-pushes-forward-for-fleets [https://perma.cc/BB6V-8GLN] (predicting continued
steep growth in adoption of monitoring technologies for commercial automobile fleets).
Federal rules have begun to require telematics in commercial trucking to ensure
compliance with, for instance, driver’s hours-of-service rules. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. pt. 395,
Subpart B (2018) (detailing Electronic Logging Device requirements).
88. Joe Mariani et al., Forging Links Into Loops: the Internet of Things’ Potential to
Recast Supply Chain Management, 17 DELOITTE REV. 119, 119, 128 (2015), https://www2.de
loitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/internet-of-things-supply-chain-management/D
UP1159_DR17_ForgingLinksIntoLoops.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RCH-FTJ6] (noting ways
IoT is transforming principles of supply chain management).
89. See, e.g., Chris Baraniuk, How Algorithms Run Amazon’s Warehouses, BBC
FUTURE (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150818-how-algorithms-runamazons-warehouses [https://perma.cc/B9R3-Z2NX] (describing use of both workers and
computer algorithms to locate, track, and package inventory in warehouses); Will Knight,
Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, Human-Robot Symbiosis, MIT TECH. REV. (July 7, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538601/inside-amazons-warehouse-human-robot-sym
biosis/ [https://perma.cc/2PKY-NQEG] (describing “robotic shelves” and other innovations
for making Amazon’s order fulfillment more efficient); Marcus Wohlsen, A Rare Peek Inside
Amazon’s
Massive
Wish-Fulfilling
Machine,
WIRED
(June
16,
2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/06/inside-amazon-warehouse/ [https://perma.cc/ZGT8-YTSE]
(describing Amazon fulfillment center (i.e., inventory warehouse) as “a uniquely 21stcentury creation-a vast, networked, intelligent engine for sating consumer desire,” and
noting that “[e]ach shelf [in the warehouse] is divided into small cubbies, and each cubby
gets a barcode and an alphanumeric ID, much like the Dewey Decimal System”).
90. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. HUGOS, ESSENTIALS OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 18–20
(3d ed. 2011) (“Wal-Mart is a company shaped by its supply chain . . . .”); id. at 125 (“Large
companies . . . such as Wal-Mart, are mandating that their suppliers start using passive
RFID tags on the products that they ship.”); MAYER-SCHÖENBERGER & CUKIER, supra note
86, at 53–54 (2013) (discussing its use of a system called “Retail Link” to connect its
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shoppers, but RFID tags are just as important, even if less
understood. RFID tags consist of microchips attached to antennas,
which can receive “queries” and transmit a “response” to them:
Tags are characterized by a unique identifier and are applied
to objects (even persons or animals). Readers trigger the tag
transmission by generating an appropriate signal, which
represents a query for the possible presence of tags in the
surrounding area and for the reception of their IDs.
Accordingly, RFID systems can be used to monitor objects in
real-time, without the need of being in line-of-sight; this
allows for mapping the real world into the virtual world. 91
P91F

To put it plainly, RFID tags allow objects to “speak” for themselves
(and among themselves), and to be communicated with remotely.
As might be expected, RFID tags range widely in terms of
functionality (e.g., range of transmission, amount of data stored,
etc.), size (as small as half a millimeter along each dimension), and
price (as little as 7¢ per tag, currently). 92 As with other forms of
microtechnology, the pace of improvement along all of these
dimensions is likely to continue, making new uses feasible.
Because it permits a direct relationship to be established
between any user and an IoT-enabled object, the IoT could serve
as the basis of a secured transactions system. The basic idea would
be that when a secured creditor evaluates collateral in anticipation
of lending, rather than having to investigate a chain of title,
interrogate control of a warehouse, or accept the risk of having an
interest later overturned, the potential creditor would merely use
a smartphone to search for security-interest tags on any items
intended to serve as collateral. Each tag would be set to transmit
a UCC registration number unique to that object, which could
allow the potential creditor to instantaneously pull up the record
(including the existing creditor’s contact information) on the
P92F

P

suppliers with real-time information about its sales and inventory levels); Nicholas
Varchaver, Scanning the Globe: The Humble Bar Code, FORTUNE (May 31, 2004),
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/05/31/370719/index.ht
m [https://perma.cc/2JGM-MESX] (“A key element of Wal-Mart’s rise has been its
hyperefficient supply chain and inventory management, which have allowed it to keep
costs—and prices—down.”).
91. Atzori et al., supra note 74, at 2790 (emphases omitted); see also Claudia
Loebbecke, RFID in the Supply Chain, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF E-COMMERCE, E-GOVERNMENT,
AND MOBILE COMMERCE 948–53 (2006) (describing technological features and business uses
of RFID).
92. See RFID Frequently Asked Question, RFID J., https://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/
show?85 [https://perma.cc/5YLE-H4S4] (noting prices can range from as low as seven cents
to as high as $25 or more depending on technology and other features desired); Atzori et
al., supra note 74, at 2790.
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state’s UCC app. Thus alerted, the potential creditor could contact
that earlier creditor (or have the debtor do so) to establish the
nature of its claim, which would then affect whether the new
creditor would proceed with the transaction or not. If no tags were
detected on the app, the creditor could rely on that fact, tag the
objects, and extend credit on a secured basis. Each creditor would
bear a burden to monitor its collateral, for instance against
manipulation or malfunction of the tags, but this could be
automated, for instance via a central node that maintained
wireless internet connections with any tagged objects, and even, if
warranted, via a video-feed (or any other type of sensor) as further
insurance. 93 Such automated monitoring would serve as proof in
any potential dispute over the collateral. This roughly sketched
system could bring a dramatic shift, and radical simplification, to
Article 9, by allowing creditors to establish, and to put others on
notice of, a direct relationship with the relevant collateral.
Article 9’s debtor- (as opposed to collateral-) centered filing
structure is far from the only possible arrangement. Various
systems already use direct identification of collateral as the basis
for providing notice of a claim in collateral and for protecting
rights vis-à-vis third parties (in other words, for the non-UCC
analogies to the UCC concept of perfection). Claims on cars, once
they have been sold, are made on title documents, which are easily
linked directly to the relevant automobiles by virtue of
standardized and mandatory vehicle identification numbers
(VINs). 94 A similar system exists for certain airplanes and
airplane parts, which in the United States, pursuant to federal law
and to international treaty, must be registered by standardized
identification number with federal authorities and with an
P93F

P94F

P

P

93. Cf. ANDREW SLAUGHTER ET AL., DELOITTE CTR. ENERGY SOLS., CONNECTED
BARRELS: TRANSFORMING OIL AND GAS STRATEGIES WITH THE INTERNET OF THINGS 10–11
(2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/iot-in-oil-and-gas-indus
try/DUP-1169_IoT_OilGas.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6EX-SSH8] (noting that “companies are
joining forces in developing a data-enabled monitoring infrastructure” to protect against oil
spills and pump breakdowns).
94. U.C.C. § 9-316(d)–(e); id. cmt. 5. The car titling system itself has been imperfect
due to lack of uniform state laws and poor integration of state systems—in other words it
too could benefit from a technological facelift. Nonetheless it is a useful illustration of the
fact that collateral-based identification is not wholly unheard-of. Cf. Larry N. Miller, A
Proposal for Modernization of the Vehicle Certificate of Title System, 49 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 400, 402 (1995); Memorandum from Professor Stephen L. Sepinuck to Ed Smith,
Chair of Joint Review Comm. for Article 9 (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shar
ed/docs/ucc9/ucc9_sepinuckmemo_021309.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/2015041515211
5/http:/www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ucc9/ucc9_sepinuckmemo_021309.pdf]
(surveying state motor vehicle certificate of title laws).
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international registry. 95 Both systems obviously bear strong
parallels to the proposed IoT-based method of perfecting security
interests.
It is easy to see why, for practical reasons, the personal
property system developed as it did: it was feasible, given 20th
century technology, to provide a unique, standardized mark on
airplane engines and cars but not to do the same for many
thousands of items of personal property. 96 Thus the debtorcentered personal property structure seemed inevitable. Now,
technology permits a different alternative.
Notably, the car titling and airplane part registration systems
were not developed primarily to protect security interests. Rather,
the car system developed to prevent theft and protect the integrity
of car manufacturing, and the airplane parts system is in large
part an initiative to build safety and reliability in the airplane
manufacturing and repair business as well as to address theft. 97
In this way, too, then, these systems are similar to the system
proposed here, because it would piggyback on technology and
practices already developed for other reasons, and then used to
develop the legal regime. In this case, secured transactions law can
take advantage of technologies developed in large part for business
reasons such as supply chain management, inventory monitoring,
factory automation, and so on.
The proposed IoT-based system would also resemble the real
P95F

P

P96F

P

P97F

P

95. The contours of this legal regime, which appears to be dominated by a relatively
small group of highly specialized merchants of expensive precision parts, remain somewhat
unclear. So far as the federal law (now supplemented with an international treaty)
stretches, it preempts the UCC. See Steven L. Harris, Cape Town Convention, in 10B
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9.55 (2018) (summarizing Cape Town Convention’s
International Registry for aircraft objects); Nettie Downs, Comment, Taking Flight from
Cape Town: Increasing Access to Aircraft Financing, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 863, 865–74 (2014)
(summarizing law); Kaitlyn Schrick, Comment, Does Anyone Have “Actual Knowledge” of
What Effects the Cape Town Treaty Has Had on the Application of Philko Aviation, Inc. v.
Shacket?, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 867, 877–81, 896 (2015) (summarizing law and identifying
potential conflict of treaty regime with Supreme Court jurisprudence).
96. Interactive “smart” maps, as required by the proposed geolocation method of
perfection, were of course also not readily available in the 20th century either. Notably,
simple, nonnetworked tags (e.g., bar code stickers) could not provide the basis for a system
in the way that IoT devices can because of the difficulty of verifying and monitoring the
presence and location of such tags (and, in addition, the difficulty of altering the information
on them).
97. See supra note 94 (motor vehicle law); supra note 95 (aircraft and parts law).
Registries have all sorts of purposes, some relating to forms of property rights and some
related to other purposes, such as the reinforcing of social norms or maintenance of group
identity. See David Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1313 (2019) (discussing the registry of eggs painted to resemble clowns’ makeup kept in
Wookey Hole, England).
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estate title recording system, which is ultimately based on
information tied directly to the particular property at issue. For
centuries, public authorities have developed and maintained
records of ownership, mortgages, and other claims upon real
property, often for reasons relating to taxation, estate
preservation, and the facilitation of reliable transactions. 98 Of
course, the proposed Article 9 system would be reliant on much
more advanced technology than the antiquated 99 and highly
fragmented 100 real estate recording systems of the United States.
In fact, real estate records are much criticized by legal scholars,
including because many of them index land records primarily by
owner names rather than by locations (tract numbers), and thus
suffer from similar problems to those characterizing the current
Article 9 system as discussed above. 101 Proposals for
technologically driven reforms in real estate recording have been
offered but have not yet gained much traction. 102 For this reason,
P98F

P9F

P10F

P

P

P

P10F

P

P102F
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98. On real estate recording, see GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 201–38 (8th ed. 2009); Lipson, supra
note 28, at 435–39 (describing early recordation systems and collecting sources).
99. Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 227, 227 (1999) (“During the past 350 years, little has changed in the way real
estate conveyances are recorded in America.”).
100. Sam Stonefield, Electronic Real Estate Documents: Context, Unresolved CostBenefit Issues and a Recommended Decisional Process, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205, 222
(2002) (“There are 3524 recording jurisdictions nationwide.”).
101. NELSON ET AL., supra note 98, at 232 (“[C]hain-of-title problems illustrate vividly
the deficiencies of name-index recording systems.”). Nonspecialists sometimes seem to
assume the existing real estate recording system is more manageable and coherent than it
is. Compare Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 1143 (“With real estate, the answer of where to
look is relatively easy. The location of the land is fixed, and the searcher merely has to learn
at which level, state or local, the records are kept.”), with NELSON ET AL., supra note 98, at
212 (“In addition to interests which need not be recorded at all (like adverse possession)
and those which need be recorded only after the fact (like mechanics’ liens), problems are
raised by those which are allowed to be . . . recorded in places other than the county
recorder’s office. . . . One compilation for Cleveland, Ohio listed 76 types of records in 16
different public offices which might contain land title data.”).
102. See, e.g., Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of Land Records: How
Advances in Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 369–70 (2010) (suggesting areas where doctrine should
be revisited as technological changes take hold in some real estate recording systems);
Donald J. Kochan, Dealing with Dirty Deeds: Matching Nemo Dat Preferences with Property
Law Pragmatism, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 54 (2015) (proposing technologically driven
amendments to recording); Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American
Land Title Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 21, 24 (2011) (lamenting
failure of real estate recording system to respond to prior calls for modernization and urging
solutions based on updated technologies); Stonefield, supra note 100, 227–28, 232
(evaluating costs and benefits of transition); Whitman, supra note 99, at 228 (“We can make
recording much easier, faster and less costly. . . . All of this can be done with the use of
digital computing technology that is virtually ‘on the shelf’ today.”). The proposed
simplification of the real estate recording system is all the more feasible given
advancements in technology. Controllers of private, for-profit “title plants” that have come
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if the proposed system takes hold in the UCC context, something
like it may also be appealing in the real estate context. Integration
of the real estate and personal property systems, which might help
address confusing conflicts between the two, might even be
possible. In any case, the examples of cars, airplane parts, and real
estate recording show that perfection by direct reference to
collateral without indexing through the debtor’s name has been
done elsewhere, and under analogous circumstances.
Several concerns about the IoT-based system sketched above
can be easily addressed.
First, there might be a concern over expense. The idea might
work for large pieces of equipment, but what about, say, an
inventory of cases of wine? The expense should not be
overestimated. As mentioned, currently RFID cost as little as 7¢
per tag, depending on the technology included in the tag itself—
such factors as how much data is stored, how far away the
information is transmitted, and what security features are
included. Active, wireless-enabled sensors—that is, those that can
directly connect with a wireless router without even the
requirement of another central node—are a few dollars each, at
most, and the most expensive technology is often reusable. As
electronics become ever smaller, more reliable, more capable of
storing data and of performing analytical and communicative
tasks, the expense could become negligible. Also, many items are
already tagged, for shipment and supply chain purchases. For
such items, meeting the Article 9 requirements would add little
expense and would merely require one extra, automated step. It
would simply reflect the already existing reality that the IoT is
deeply integrated into the practices of commerce.
Second, there might be a concern over the tags being stripped
off or losing power over time. The burden of proving that tags were
operational at a given time (for instance in a dispute with a future
creditor or buyer) would fall on the creditor claiming an interest:
the system is not “tag and forget about it,” but rather “tag and
monitor.” Monitoring could be done by regularly “pinging” each
tag, and by using cameras or other sensors as appropriate to
ensure collateral has not been tampered with: records of these
to dominate real estate title searching might complicate such efforts. See NELSON, supra
note 98, at 204 (noting that entrenched interests may be a reason real estate recording has
not been reformed); Whitman, supra note 99, at 230–31 (explaining title plants); Dale A.
Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2002) (outlining practical and political difficulties with shifts to
higher technology recording).
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processes would serve as sufficient proof of the maintenance of the
interest in collateral. Monitoring could be automated, with
technology that is already widely available “off the rack” at
minimal cost. 103 Thus, tag degradation, in addition to being rare,
could be easily monitored and corrected when it does occur.
Third, there might be a concern over transportation of
collateral. When collateral leaves a monitored space (say, a
warehouse) and is transported somewhere else (say, a delivery
truck), the connection of the item to the IoT network might well be
severed, thus preventing monitoring. But it is not at all clear that
such a severance is required. Many vehicles are or can be equipped
with wireless internet connections. For more valuable devices, a
transmitter capable of maintaining a connection to cellular
networks is also possible where wireless internet is lacking. In any
case, even where a temporary severance of connection is
anticipated by a creditor, the creditor could take appropriate steps
to maintain the connection, employ an agent to protect the
collateral in transit, or to release the security interest (for
instance, in favor of a new shipment arriving into the warehouse)
as appropriate. The risk of forfeiting an interest due to failure to
monitor in transit would not seem to be much of a problem. In fact,
the IoT approach’s advantage is that it permits increased certainty
and relatively easy maintenance of a claim for mobile collateral.
By contrast, consider what a creditor must do under the
current system to maintain a claim over a piece of collateral that
is mobile: file an accurate financing statement, and then either (a)
trust the debtor and hope for the best, or (b) monitor the collateral
and be able to trace it back to the debtor’s ownership at the
relevant time frame. The addition of the requirement of tagging is
likely to be a substantial additional burden only on a creditor
relying on (a) alone. The creditor who has chosen course (b) will
likely find that tagging adds little burden, if any, because the
monitoring it is already doing will likely match that required
under the new system. Also, the IoT approach would remove the
initial burden of filing a financing statement as well as all the
uncertainties of the current system in instances of change of
P103F

P

103. Releasing or transferring interests could also be easily automated. For instance,
RFID technology routinely allows for information to be securely re-written by a possessor
of the password for a given tag. Frequently Asked Questions, RFID J., http://www.rfidjourna
l.com/site/faqs [https://perma.cc/QWR4-RDR8] (last visited Apr. 16, 2018) (“With read-write
[RFID] chips, you can add information to the tag or write over existing information when
the tag is within range of a reader . . . .”).
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ownership and location. 104
Thus, potential concerns can be assuaged, in large part. 105
Despite its many advantages, there are two major limitations
to any system based solely on the IoT, at least with current
technology. The two problems are difficult-to-tag items and items
with a high turnover rate.
First, certain collateral may simply be difficult to tag.
Consider corn in a silo or oil in a tank. While tech-enabled
monitoring such collateral is certainly possible, tagging seems
much less so. It is possible to conceive of a sensor-equipped tag
that would keep track of each new addition to the tank or silo and
proclaim the interest to any inquirers, but such a system seems to
shift too much of the burden to a searcher for such interest. In
other words, the tag in such a case seems like it would be
insufficiently clear to those investigating the status of goods for
existing encumbrances. There is no obvious way to solve this at
present.
A second problem involves high-turnover items such as goods
held as inventory in an urban retail environment. Tagging and
registering the security in each item as it enters and exists
inventory might be overly burdensome in some contexts. Many
items are already RFID-tagged—such as clothing in the inventory
of some retailers 106—thus showing that the task is not impossible.
Nonetheless, because of the vast number of objects involved, and
given the current state of technology, it must be conceded that the
IoT system may not yet be up to the task.
It is far from a stretch to imagine that technological
advancement would render these problems manageable in the
future. Yet for now, they suggest that the IoT approach on its own
might not be feasible at the present time.
P104F

P105F

P106F

P

104. Concerning the laws for collateral or debtors crossing state lines, see supra
Section II.A.2.
105. There are other detailed questions and concerns that would arise from any fullscale modification of the Article 9 system. For instance, concerns over implementation
difficulties, weighing of costs and benefits, overlap with other bodies of law, and numerous
others. But because this Article’s actual proposal is a hybrid one, based not just on IoT but
also on geolocation technologies, consideration of these is deferred to Part IV, which lays
out this Article’s proposed system in more detail, and Part V, which answers several other
objections.
106. See, e.g., Lauren Indvik, Why Luxury Brands Are Putting Microchips in Your
Clothes and Accessories, FASHIONISTA (Apr. 14, 2016), https://fashionista.com/2016/04/monc
ler-ferragamo-rfid-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/6D5Y-D6LM] (noting security and
prestige benefits of tagging to ascertain authenticity of luxury products).
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B. Geolocation Technology
A second area of promising technology is geolocation.
Geolocation technologies permit the pinpointing of precise
locations anywhere in the United States (and most of the world),
as well as the overlaying of other information on top of location
data. 107 A point or area, plotted with longitude and latitude data
(e.g., as identified by clicks on an interactive map), 108 can be
overlaid with street names, tract numbers, elevations, crime
records, and so on. All that is required is a database document
linking (1) a list of the location information to map an area with
(2) whatever additional information is to be associated with that
area. There are widely available, high quality, and often free tools
to convert such a list into a viewable “smart map,” which displays
all the information visually. 109 These technologies are used
regularly by individuals, businesses, and governments. 110 State
and local authorities maintain various databases linking area
maps to information about individual properties for uses such as
P107F

P

P108F

P109F

P

P

P10F

P

107. See generally Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century,
72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 1070–71 (2007) (outlining innovations to real estate law and practice
permitted by accuracy and low expense of global position system technologies); Harlan J.
Onsrud & Robert I. Reis, Law and Information Policy for Spatial Databases: A Research
Agenda, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 377 (1995) (providing overview of basic concepts and areas of
legal concern); Jeremy Speich, Comment, The Legal Implications Of Geographical
Information Systems (GIS), 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 360–62 (2001) (summarizing
features of global information system).
108. Google Maps, for instance, requires a user only to right-click and select “What’s
Here?” to provide the longitude and latitude of any mapped item. It plots the University of
Kentucky’s Law Building at latitude 38.036829, longitude -84.507237. Searching from
those coordinates will also point a user to that location. See Google Maps, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/maps/ [https://perma.cc/6P82-7J7Y] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
109. Margaret Rhodes, A Dead-Simple Tool that Lets Anyone Create Interactive Maps,
WIRED, (July 15, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/a-drag-and-drop-toolkit-that-letsanyone-create-interactive-maps/ [https://perma.cc/VPK9-HTA8] (describing several tools).
The software company Tableau, for instance, makes several powerful, easy-to-use, free
tools. See Resources, TABLEAU, https://public.tableau.com/en-us/s/resources [https://perma.c
c/N76F-X3RS] (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). Google provides tools for use with its Google
Maps platform. See Visualize Your Data on a Custom Map Using Google My Maps, GOOGLE
EARTH, https://www.google.com/earth/outreach/learn/visualize-your-data-on-a-custom-ma
p-using-google-my-maps/ [https://perma.cc/A8RC-UDL2] (providing sample database file
and step-by-step instructions for producing a custom map). Creative uses of such tools
abound. See, e.g., Nell Casey, Interactive Map Shows What NYC Neighborhoods Have the
Most Rat-Infested Restaurants, GOTHAMIST (June 10, 2015), http://gothamist.com/2015/06/1
0/rat_map_2015.php [https://perma.cc/6SVS-R639].
110. See generally Speich, supra note 107, at 361–62 (outlining existing and potential
uses such as land use, real estate and taxation, voting and census, and evidence collection).
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assessing taxes 111 or inspecting restaurants. 112 Journalists have
constructed their own smart maps. 113 An academic recently
proposed to ease the burden on landowners by permitting them to
“post” a “no trespassing” sign virtually on such maps, which would
be available remotely on smart devices and GPS locaters to hikers
and hunters. 114 Smart maps can also be made to be interactive,
such that anyone with rights to add to a map can simply click on
one or more points to designate a new location, and then enter
additional information to be overlaid on that point. 115 Geolocation
technologies, when combined with other related developments—
the extensive availability of mobile devices, reliable mobile
payment capabilities, and speedy background and license checks—
have permitted the rise of ride-sharing services such as Uber. 116
It is possible to imagine a filing system based on geolocation
technology. The filing system could work like this: each state filing
office would maintain a smart map available for free on an internet
site. The map would show all existing claims of security interests
within any particular geographic area in the state. A creditor
desiring to add a claim of its own could obtain a username and
password. Then, by clicking an area on a map and filling in basic
information about the claimed interest, the creditor would be able
to stake its claim to collateral within a given area. The creditor
would have to provide its contact information, and describe the
collateral claimed (“all assets,” “inventory,” “backhoe with serial
number #xxx”). Nothing more would be required. The secured
party would have thereby perfected its security interests on any
P1F

P

P12F

P13F

P14F

P

P

P

P15F

P

P16F

111. Travis County, Texas, where the city of Austin is located, maintains such a map
and database. See Map Search, TRAVIS CAD, http://propaccess.traviscad.org/mapSearch/
[https://perma.cc/N65D-BADY] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
112. See Restaurant Inspection Information, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL
HYGIENE,
http://a816-restaurantinspection.nyc.gov/RestaurantInspection/SearchBrow
se.do [https://perma.cc/3Y46-ZX9X] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (providing an interactive
map but requiring specification of numerous search criteria before returning results).
Private parties can then create their own interfaces for the same data. See Jeremy White,
New York Health Department Restaurant Ratings Map, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.co
m/interactive/dining/new-york-health-department-restaurant-ratings-map.html
[https://perma.cc/B237-5YG7] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
113. See, e.g., White, supra note 112 (New York City restaurants); Casey, supra note
109 (rats in New York City restaurants).
114. See Hynes, supra note 26, at 963–64. Hynes imagines that the system would be
organized through the property tax system, but an interactive map would be possible. Id.
at 974.
115. See, e.g., Smart Mapping, ESRI, http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/smartmapping [https://perma.cc/UQX6-6D6X] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
116. See, e.g., John Patrick Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About Uber, TIME
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3556741/uber/ [https://perma.cc/R4YW-9AQ6] (describing
the basic aspects of Uber’s operations).
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collateral matching the provided description within the denoted
area. 117 If a debtor had multiple locations, a secured party could
go through this process for each of the debtor’s locations, which
would require little extra work.
Under this imagined system, any party interested in claiming
collateral located within an area would be able to easily pull up
the map and check to see if there was a competitor. Obviously, if a
party had staked a valid claim in a particular area, the new
creditor would have to negotiate with the prior creditor to narrow
that interest, proceed with staking the claim while accepting a
lower-priority spot in line, or simply decline to lend. On the other
hand, if the claim on a particular area was not valid—for instance
because the prior creditor had selected too large an area or had left
the claim in place even though the debt had been paid—the system
would be similar to the current system, in that the prior creditor
would be obligated to narrow the claimed area or delete the claim,
as appropriate (or risk liability). 118
One objection to the imagined system might be that it would
not deal well with a situation in which multiple debtors granted
security interests in items within a given area. For instance,
imagine there were two debtors sharing a warehouse. The system
as described would not require a creditor to specify the debtor’s
name. Even if Creditor A’s dealings are only with Debtor A and
not Debtor B, a new creditor might be reluctant to lend against
Debtor B’s property in that warehouse. Under Article 9 rules, even
though Creditor A’s security interest would attach (and be
perfected) only against Debtor A’s property, the notice could
theoretically permit Creditor A to lend to Debtor B at a later point
and have higher priority than any later claims. 119
This challenge seems surmountable. One obvious solution
might be for the law to require Creditor A to amend its claim to
attach an addendum upon request of Debtor B (as an owner of
P17F

P

P18F

P19F

117. As with the current system, the secured party would only have perfected its
interest to the extent its interest had attached—it would not have thereby encumbered
property, for instance of parties other than the debtor.
118. U.C.C. § 9-513 (creditor must file statement indicating termination of security
interest when appropriate); id. § 9-625(e) (creditor will owe damages if it files an
unauthorized financing statement or refuses to file termination statement when
appropriate). Arguably, any amended system should strengthen, or at least clarify, these
provisions to make clear the creditor’s obligations.
119. This would be similar to the effect now of lending to a debtor when there is an
existing financing statement, even if the security interest to which that statement relates
has not yet become enforceable. See 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 33:3 (discussing this
“first in time, first in right” rule of U.C.C. § 9-322(a)). Essentially, these rules oblige the
debtor and new creditor to reach an agreement with the old creditor if the new creditor
wishes to be ensured of priority. U.C.C. § 9-339; id. cmt. 2.
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other property within the claimed area). The addendum would be
a binding declaration as to which debtor the security interest
attached; in other words, it would limit the creditor’s claim to the
property of Debtor A, thus providing the new creditor with some
assurance that its interest would not be threatened. Even so, given
the potential for confusion, the old and new creditors might well
feel the need to reach a broader agreement among themselves
concerning their respective claims and articles of collateral. This
solution might seem burdensome but consider this same situation
under the current system. It is difficult to conceive that many
creditors would lend against the second debtor’s supposedly
unencumbered assets stored in the same warehouse as another
debtor’s encumbered assets, at least without having a
subordination agreement or some other form of inter-creditor
contractual assurance in place with respect to the prior creditor.
The more substantial objection to the geolocation system is
the more obvious one—that interests are only perfected within the
specified area. Under this imagined system, there is no clear way
of maintaining an interest when items are removed from the
designated area. Of course, one location might often be sufficient.
An inventory lender might be content to know that the current
contents of the warehouse will remain its collateral and might be
comfortable with its interest being released when the items are
removed. But other lenders might wish to maintain their interests
beyond a specific location.
Solutions to this problem are conceivable. For instance, a
security interest perfected by geolocation could remain perfected
for a short grace period while the creditor has the opportunity to
investigate the situation and stake a claim in the new location of
the asset. 120 Just as “tag and monitor” was the requirement of the
imagined IoT system, so “claim and monitor” would be required by
a geolocation-based system. Again, such monitoring might be
inexpensive thanks to modern technology—in fact, again, due to
IoT technologies that permit for inexpensive, remote, automated
sensing and tracking. In addition, it is far from clear that the
monitoring requirements of the system as described would be
substantially more burdensome than the current system. Under
the current system, it is true that a valid claim could be asserted
further in the future than in the imagined system—creditors are
P120F

P

120. See infra Section IV.A (discussing this as a solution to problems that might arise
from a filing system based on geolocation technology).
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not limited by some legally imposed grace period. 121 But
realistically, once property of a debtor is moved to another location
upon purchase, theft, or otherwise, it is hard to imagine that many
creditors can later locate and successfully assert claims against
that property. A creditor who cares about collateral must monitor
that collateral—no matter what the law technically permits or
requires.
A geolocation-based secured transactions system would have
the appeal of simplicity and of increased certainty. The interface
could be easily and intuitively navigated and could provide parties
with considerable certainty under most of the real-world
circumstances in which security interests are claimed, including
the storage of inventory in warehouses. The capacity of parties to
specify the scope of their interests in an objective, easily
searchable visible format on a map holds great appeal. But
geolocation’s inability to deal with mobile objects represents a
weakness. Accordingly, this Article proposes that the new secured
transactions perfection system be a hybrid one, drawing on the
strengths of both geolocation and IoT technologies and avoiding
the weaknesses of each.
P12F

P

IV. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
As explained in the previous Part, both geolocation and IoT
technologies hold great promise as potential substitutes for the
current secured transactions regime. However, under the current
state of technology, there would be significant weaknesses in a
system based exclusively on one or the other. While IoT technology
is inexpensive and provides the most direct way of establishing
and providing notice of the security-interest connection between
creditor and collateral, IoT technology is not yet so easy to
automate and so cheap to deploy that it can be imagined as a way
of dealing with all collateral in all situations. For instance, it
might be cumbersome to use it for large warehouses or large stores
containing many small, individually packaged items. By contrast,
geolocation technologies excel in the common scenario of property
being held in one place for most or all of its useful life as collateral,
thus filling the gap left by IoT technology. Geolocated claims can
be made cheaply and easily, and the claims would be highly
transparent to any searchers after records. The weakness of this
approach, however, is that if a creditor desires to maintain a

121. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64 (discussing complications of
maintaining perfection under the current system); see also U.C.C. § 9-315(a).
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security interest over collateral as it moves from place to place,
geolocation provides no obvious means to do so. An IoT approach,
of course, does. As is readily apparent, then, the two technologies
have complementary strengths.
This Part proposes a reformed secured transactions system, a
hybrid involving the use of both IoT and geolocation technologies.
In rough outline, the proposed system would permit notice of
claims of security interests in tangible collateral to be claimed
either through an IoT tagging approach or through geolocation. 122
Once claimed, and provided that certain monitoring requirements
are complied with, the proposed system would provide
significantly improved commercial certainty. Numerous existing
provisions, most notably those regarding proceeds, would be
jettisoned or greatly simplified, and numerous exceptions would
be eliminated.
Section A outlines how the hybrid system would work. Section
B works through several examples of its proposed operation. These
sections explain how the proposed law would assign rights and
responsibilities to participants in secured transactions, and what
would change or be eliminated from the current law. The next Part
provides a discussion of several specific concerns that the proposal
might provoke.
P12F

P

A. The Proposed System in Outline
The proposed system is easily described and is, from a legal
perspective and compared with the current regime, very simple.
Tagging. First, collateral could be tagged with an RFID or
other transmitting beacon containing basic information about the
claimed security interest and contact information for the party
claiming the interest, along with a unique alphanumeric code
identifying that object. 123 Once the tag is affixed and registered
with a given Secretary of State, the security interest would be
perfected within that state’s boundaries. If creditors were
concerned about collateral “walking” across state lines without
consent, there is no reason that they could not register the same
P123F

P

122. Interests in intangible collateral would be left as-is. See infra notes 133–35 and
accompanying text.
123. It is unlikely that there would be a limit to the unique collateral codes available.
The underlying architecture of the internet has been adjusted to permit much larger
numbers of uniquely identified participants: Internet Protocol v6, the transition to which
began in 2012, permits up to 3.4×1038 unique addresses. See generally Overview, GOOGLE
IPV6, https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/index.html [https://perma.cc/3M7W-XEEM].
More simply, consider that there are over 2.176 billion (i.e., 366) unique combinations of
alphanumeric characters if each combination uses only six characters.
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collateral in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. Collateral in a box or other container could be tagged on an
entire-container basis, although once the individual items were
separated from the container, perfection would cease.
Geolocation. Alternatively (or additionally, at the creditor’s
election), a security interest could be perfected by designating an
area using coordinates registered on a map maintained by the
Secretary of State of each state, providing contact information and
a legal description of the collateral claimed within that area. 124
The process of claiming a geolocated interest would be simple. A
creditor would obtain a username and password to log in to the
system and provide a credit or bank card number. Thus, only
“known” parties would be able to add entries to the interactive
map, which would serve as protection against fraudulent or
frivolous claims. 125 Next, the creditor would navigate on the map
to the desired spot, identify the relevant area by clicking on its four
corners (or if the map was linked to an existing tract map, simply
click on the desired tract(s)). The creditor would identify the
collateral that it claimed an interest in within that area (“all
collateral,” “crane with serial # ___”) and fill in its name and
contact information. With no further steps needed, the claim
would be made at that point. Any searcher could easily pull up the
map, navigate to an area of interest, receive notice of the claim,
and take appropriate steps.
As with the current system, there is of course some possibility
of abuse because a creditor could easily encumber more than
intended by simply submitting a filing covering more than strictly
necessary and claiming “all assets” as collateral. Thus, there
would need to be a clearing mechanism available for parties
covered by a too-broad filing (perhaps together with penalties for
P124F

P125F

P

P

124. See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text (discussing geolocation
technologies).
125. There is no reason to think the proposed system would be any more plagued by
false filings than the current system, which is not particularly effective at dealing with this
problem. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE, STATE STRATEGIES TO SUBVERT FRAUDULENT
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) FILINGS (2014), http://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/
surveys/2017-08/final-nass-report-bogus-filings-040914.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGU2-J9E6]
(describing fraudulent filings problem, state and federal law-based remedies, and potential
solutions). A technologically streamlined system could provide for more effective policing of
abusive filings. A similar system has been implemented elsewhere. See Todd J. Janzen,
Note, Nationalize the Revised Article 9 Filing System: A Comparison of the Old Article 9
and Canadian Personal Property Filing Systems, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 401
(2001) (“Ontario protects debtors by limiting who can file a financing statement
electronically. . . . [A] filing party must register with . . . the central filing office, in order to
obtain an account. This account allows the filing party . . . to submit financing statements
electronically.”).
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carelessly or intentionally overbroad filings). In addition, the law
might need to limit the size of each area covered, to prevent
creditors from seeking to encumber assets from a broader area
than intended. 126
For the foreseeable future, the geolocation route to perfection
remains important, as it may be the only feasible way of perfecting
in certain collateral, the tagging of which would be too difficult or
too expensive with current technology. However, if IoT-enabled
tags move from being common (as they are now), to being
ubiquitous, then the perfection process could, for instance, simply
become part of the inventory intake process, with registration of
the creditor’s interest accomplished automatically as each
shipment is scanned into a warehouse or store and monitored
thereafter by IoT security mechanisms that are themselves
already common. In such an instance, geolocation might or might
not remain necessary as a parallel system.
Priority. If an item were both tagged and located within a
geolocated claim, the first interest to be claimed over that item
would generally prevail. The over that item proviso is important: if
an already tagged item were later brought within a geolocated
area, the tagged interest would prevail, even if the geolocated
claim over the area was made before the item was tagged. As long
as the tagging was done prior to the item entering the area, it
would prevail. On the other hand, if an item within a
geolocationally claimed area were then tagged, the geolocated
interest would prevail—of course, only so long as the item remains
within that area.
As under current law, 127 a party could remain perfected (i.e.,
have perfection “credited back” to the original date of a claim) over
an item by overlapping one method of perfection with the other. In
other words, it could remain continuously perfected in an item
even after it was removed from a perfected-by-geolocation area by
perfecting-by-tagging the item before it left that area. Insofar as
proving the time of a claim might be difficult for a particular
geolocated item, increased monitoring systems could help—most
obviously, a video display of the object upon arrival or construction
in a space would be a useful form of proof. Such proof would
usually be no more complicated, and might often be simpler, than
P126F

P127F

P

126. Upper limits of areas to be claimed could even be adjusted to the average density
in an area. In urban areas, perhaps only a block or fraction of a block could be covered per
claim, whereas in vast open places such as West Texas, upper limits of filings could be much
larger to permit coverage of cattle, for instance.
127. See U.C.C. § 9-308(c).
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proving possession or ownership at a given time by a given debtor
under the existing legal regime. 128 Proving a time of tagging
should usually be easy, although similar proof could easily be
produced.
Although predicting technological development is a perilous
task, the IoT is likely to continue to develop by allowing smoother
and fuller integration of numerous types of technology. Already,
the IoT involves inputs not just from RFID-type tags but also from
visual contacts, temperature and other sensors, and even
monitoring by drone. Geolocation technologies are a part of the
panoply of interrelated technologies that augment the IoT. It is not
hard to imagine that the two aspects of the proposed system could
be linked, such that IoT interests could be continuously plotted on
maps as well, providing two forms of notice (one remote, one shortrange) of a security interest, and allowing ever easier and more
automated monitoring.
Proceeds. Under current law, a perfected security interest is
often maintained even after the sale or exchange of an item, both
in the original item (now sold) and in whatever has been obtained
through the sale (money, an account receivable, etc.). 129 While
there are important exceptions to this principle, most importantly
for “[b]uyer[s] in [the] ordinary course of business,” there are
exceptions-to-the-exceptions as well. 130 The law is full of traps for
the unwary and is at best imperfect.
In the proposed system, the entire proceeds regime would be
eliminated. This is its most significant advantage, as well as
perhaps its most disruptive aspect. Perfected security interests in
the original collateral would generally be unaffected by sale or
disposition of the collateral. With the exception of the rules
concerning buyers in ordinary course and sales to which a creditor
has consented, the sale or disposition would simply not affect the
perfection of a security interest. As long as collateral remained
within the geolocated area, it would remain encumbered. If it were
removed, however, an assertion of the security interest would be
required within seven days. As for tagged collateral, the security
interest would remain as long as the tag remained operative, and
P128F

P

P129F

P130F

P

P

128. Imagine a creditor with a second-filed financing statement claims to have been
earlier perfected by virtue of having possession nine years before, prior to the first financing
statement having been filed. This illustrates the difficulty under current law of disproving
such matters as possession, when possession can be established by anyone who has agreed
to act on the secured creditor’s behalf. See LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 67, at 390 (using
Problem 22.3 to illustrate this point); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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again, there would be a short challenge window once it was no
longer operative. In other words, absent the narrow but important
exceptions already mentioned, the rule would be that once
attached and perfected, a security interest persists so long as the
tagging or geolocation covers the property. As soon as one of those
means of perfection has lapsed, the creditor would have a very
short grace period to re-establish or assert the interest.
To assert a security interest in what was acquired by the sale
or disposition (what is currently known as proceeds), the secured
creditor would have to perfect some other way. If the new property
of the debtor fell within the description of collateral claims in an
already demarcated geolocated area, then it would be included as
soon as it arrived on premises. The same principle would apply to
tagged items. Upon the arrival of new inventory, for instance, tags
on cases of wine or other collateral could be immediately
electronically activated when scanned, on an automated basis.
Technically speaking, then, the security interest could (by
agreement) extend to proceeds but would not do so as a matter of
course, and in any case, perfection in the original collateral would
not automatically follow in the proceeds. 131
Numerous other details concerning the proposed system
would have to be considered before implementation, 132 but this
description suffices as to the basic features of the system and the
ways in which it can be distinguished from the existing system.
Intangibles. Article 9 provides for security interests to be
perfected in a range of intangible types of property, such as trade
secrets, copyrights, accounts receivable, and so on. 133 Because
intangibles are not “things” that can be tagged and tracked, nor
are they geolocatable, the proposed system would not apply to
them. The proposed system would largely leave the current system
in place with respect to intangibles. This makes sense: for
instance, accounts receivable are probably best identified by
means of the party to whom payment is initially owing—i.e., the
P13F

P132F

P13F

P

P

131. For an analysis concerning the problems with the current proceeds regime, see
supra Section II.A.2.b.
132. For instance, the maximum length of effectiveness of a registered claim, currently
provided for by U.C.C. § 9-515; and the treatment of proceeds in bankruptcy, currently
provided for by 11 U.S.C. § 552. I intend to consider some details of potential
implementation in future work.
133. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2), (42); see id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). Depending on the precise form
they take, what are colloquially referred to as accounts receivable can fall, sometimes,
within the scope of other UCC terms, such as payment intangible, id. § 9-102(a)(61), or even
instrument, see id. § 9-102(a)(47), but the analysis here would not be changed substantially
in either case.
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owner of the account. A similar principle is true of the party who
owns a trade secret, an unregistered copyright, and so on.
It might seem burdensome to have three parallel systems—
the geolocation system, the tagging system, and the legacy system
that would be left in place for intangibles. However, the burden is
actually light because there would be little overlap among the
different systems. Intangibles under the current system are
frequently generated from the sale of tangible assets—for
instance, accounts receivable—with the new intangible being
treated as “proceeds” of the tangible collateral. 134 That would no
longer be the case under the proposed system. Hidden liens on
accounts in favor of one creditor arising from the sale of that
creditor’s tangible collateral would no longer have any power. In
other words, perfection in the tangible systems would not
significantly affect the intangible system, and vice-versa. Thus,
ascertaining who had a claim to the intangibles would be easier
under the proposed system.
The secured transactions regime governing intangibles is
already complicated by a confusing overlap of federal and state
law, particularly with respect to intellectual property, and is in
grave need of reform. 135 While the regime for perfecting interests
in intangibles will remain confusing until broader reform is
initiated, the proposed system would simplify the current system
P134F

P135F

P

P

134. See id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds); supra notes 63–70 and accompanying
text.
135. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Financing Information Technologies: Fairness and
Function, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1067, 1105–07, 1123–25, 1153 (critiquing the Article 9 regime
on intangibles); Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The
(Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 141, 150, 156–57, 164–65 (2007)
(arguing that the distinction of tangible/intangible property presents problems and
proposing better functional distinctions).
With respect to copyrights, for instance, legal authorities are divided on when
security interests must be filed in the federal Copyright Office and when in the UCC filing
offices. 4 WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, § 30:30, at 116–17 (noting divisions in law concerning
copyrights). This has initiated considerable uncertainty, misleading creditors, splitting
courts, and inciting criticism from academics. Id. § 30:30, at 114, 116–18; see also Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, Land Recording and Copyright Reform, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1497, 1499–1508 (2013) (analogizing defects in the copyright system to those of the land
recording system).
By contrast, patents, another important category of intangibles, are currently
perfected in the UCC filing system, while ownership interests in them are made by
reference to their federal patent office identifiers. This bifurcation is confusing and seems
inefficient. Where there is a centralized system for granting or protecting property interests
in such assets, it makes the most sense to permit claims perfecting security interests to be
made in the same place as ownership claims. Such an alternative system is not always
practicable, but where it is, it provides a direct link between creditor and collateral
comparable to that proposed in this Article for other forms of property, and it should be
implemented.
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by removing some of the complicated linkages between methods of
ascertaining interests in tangible and intangible forms of property.
Possession. Another alternative that lawmakers could
consider is to provide yet another route to perfection, which could
be termed “notorious possession,” that is, possession that is
marked and clear to any observer. 136 Notorious possession would
be unlike the type that is permitted under Article 9, where
possession is easily obtained or falsified without true notice to any
other party having been provided. 137 A creditor could claim this
form of possession simply by clearly and unmistakably possessing
an item.
In most cases, geolocation could accomplish much the same
end because a creditor could simply claim the location where the
creditor was holding the collateral on the UCC map. But under
some circumstances—for instance if a debtor is transporting
collateral from place to place and has not yet been able to tag it—
notorious possession could be another sensible supplement to the
proposed system. As with the other proposed means of protection,
the creditor would bear the burden of monitoring the collateral and
maintaining sufficient records to demonstrate its possession at the
relevant times.
Implementation. The proposed regime is radically different
from the present one. Its implementation, however, need not be
radically disruptive. 138 The old debtor name-based register could
be maintained, and the validity of perfection obtained under it left
in place long enough to provide parties a chance to adjust and reperfect as necessary. Consent granted for the initial financing
statement (which can be implied from the consent granted in a
security agreement) could cover an amendment to perfection
practices within the scope of the original agreement. 139 If a creditor
re-perfected under the new system during the transition period,
perfection could be deemed to have been continuous from the time
of the original filing under the prior regime. At some point,
perfection obtained by the new system would begin to be given
priority over perfection obtained the prior way. Either at that
P136F

P

P137F

P138F

P

P

P139F

P

136. The possession rules could also require the name and contact information of the
possession creditor (or its agent) to be clearly observable as well, to facilitate inquiry.
137. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
138. For an analysis concerning the transition from the major 2001 revision, see
Caroline N. Brown, U.C.C. Revised Article 9: The Transition Rules, 79 N.C. L. REV. 993
(2001).
139. See U.C.C. § 9-509(b) (consent to security agreement implicitly includes consent
to all necessary financing statements and other filings).
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same time or at a later point, perfection under the old system
would be deemed to have lapsed as to lien creditors and other
potential claimants on the collateral.
It is conceivable that automation could help with the
transition to the new system, particularly if state authorities were
to take the initiative. The name and address of both creditor and
debtor are supposed to be included on the UCC1 forms currently
on file. 140 A state filing office could notify the creditor at the
address given on the current form and could provide the creditor
with the opportunity, for a fee, to instruct the office to re-perfect
the interest by identifying it on the map using the debtor’s
address. 141
Fees and funding. The current Article 9 regime generates
funds for the filing offices, 142 usually the Secretaries of State of
each state. 143 The proposed system would as well, particularly
after implementation and transition costs have been paid. The
transition to the new system would require some amount of initial
investment, but much of the required costs could be covered by a
fee structure designed generally to approximate the current
structure. Much or all of the proposed software could be partially
obtained on an off-the-rack basis, and the experience of the first
states to transition to the new regime could benefit the later states
to transition.
The fee structure for filings would require some adjustment.
One solution would be to permit users of the IoT-based service to
pay a regular (biannual, annual, monthly, etc.) fixed fee covering
as many filings as they wish. In any case, the per-filing fee for IoT
registrations will have to be low, to allow for the many thousands
of filings that the system contemplates. As for claims based on
geolocation, one option would be to require users to pay a small fee
for each claim made, perhaps with fees linked to the size of the
claimed area, to discourage overbreadth. Another alternative
would again be to charge a user fee that includes the right to make
a number of claims.
P140F

P

P14F

P142F

P143F

P

P

140. See id. § 9-502(a) (noting requirements of financing statements); id. § 9-516(b)
(stating record filing requirements); id. § 9-521(a) (displaying sections one and three of the
UCC1 model form).
141. Because filings would be at the location of collateral and not state of
incorporation, this solution would require coordination between states.
142. See U.C.C. § 9-516(a) (discussing the need to pay the appropriate fee with the
filing office for filing to be effective).
143. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code, KY. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.ky.gov/
bus/UCC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/JY6A-KNSP] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
(demonstrating that in Kentucky, the Secretary of State runs the UCC filing office).
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In terms of how long filings would remain valid, one
alternative is to adopt a system akin to that of some Canadian
provinces, where users can choose the length of time of
effectiveness, with fees rising on a sliding scale based on the length
of time claimed. 144 With tagged claims, because IoT hardware
generally has a lifetime of years not decades, there may be a
natural limit to how long parties will pay to register the interests.
By contrast, under the IoT system, parties need not sift through
multiple search results to find the relevant information about a
given piece of collateral, because each registration would have its
own specific alphanumeric identifier. 145 Geolocated claims could
be cleared out by the process described above when they are no
longer valid over the identified area.
There is of course a tension between allowing sufficient fees
to be charged so that filing offices can maintain a well-functioning,
secure infrastructure and qualified staff and imposing fees so high
that they deter parties from using the system. As under the
current system, the proposed system would defer to states to strike
this balance, on the reasonable assumption that users of the
system will have sufficient incentive to advocate against filing
offices seeking to charge exorbitant fees. There have been
proposals to induce competition among state filing offices, or even
to eliminate them in favor of national filing. 146 If these proposals
gain steam, they might help lessen concerns over inconsistencies
or inequities in state fee structures. The uniform law
commissioners could also have a role if states are perceived to
abuse their rights to set their own fees. 147
P14F

P

P145F

P

P146F

P

P147F

B. Examples of the Proposed System’s Operation
The previous section provided an overview of the proposed
legal regime for secured transactions. To illustrate how the
proposed regime would work, this section provides examples of the
new law’s effect on several common types of secured financing
arrangements.

144. This appears to be the Canadian approach. See Ronald C.C. Cuming, Article 9
North of 49º: The Canadian PPS Acts and the Quebec Civil Code, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971,
981 (1996) (“When registering a financing statement, the registering party can choose the
period of registration between one and twenty-five years or the party can choose infinity
registration. The registration fees in Saskatchewan are five dollars per year or $400 for
infinity registration.”).
145. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting the availability of identifiers).
146. See LoPucki, supra note 27, at 15–16.
147. See U.C.C. § 9-526(a) cmt. 3 (permitting states to set fee structure); id. §§ 9-519
to -520 (providing the responsibilities of filing offices).
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Consider the example of a restaurant, with revolving
inventory and existing equipment in place, all of its collateral for
a loan from Acme Bank. The equipment could include ovens as
well as plates, glasses, and flatware for service. The restaurant’s
inventory could include food and drink that fill those plates and
glasses.
Equipment such as an oven would be easy to tag—an RFID
tag or WiFi-transmitting device would operate like a “beacon” to
any nearby readers, including a wireless router. The tag would
include an identifying number and a statement to the effect of
“Oven is Collateral of Acme Bank,” with contact information for
the secured party, and registered in the relevant filing office (i.e.,
the state Secretary of State). The tag could be read by any party
with a device capable of reading such tags (including most
smartphones). If the security interest is lifted (for instance, the
obligation is satisfied), then the tag could be removed or remotely
reprogrammed to be blank or to specify a new secured creditor. If
the oven is moved, the secured creditor could ascertain that fact
very quickly—either by cheap, regular monitoring by hand-held
devices (which could be wielded by the debtor’s employees, with
updates uploaded and transmitted to the secured creditor’s
collateral management program 148), or by virtue of a direct
connection of the oven to a wireless network in the restaurant. The
tag would be difficult or impossible to remove from the oven
without breaking the tag, which would thus no longer transmit as
designed and set off remote alarms for the creditor.
Legally speaking, the burden would be on the secured creditor
to monitor its collateral and pursue remedies—locating the oven,
calling the debt, taking whatever other steps are permitted by the
contract. With an automated system established, the creditor
could prove the location of the collateral and the existence of its
tag at any given time. Thus, if any competing creditor tried to tag
the oven and claim priority, the original creditor would be able to
refute such a claim easily. In fact, the same monitoring system
that allows it to maintain contact with its own tag would also
detect such a competing interest as soon as its establishment was
attempted, since the competing tag would be readable. If a creditor
sought to maintain the tag longer than was permissible, then a
debtor could bring a legal challenge to have the creditor’s claim
(and its corresponding tag) lawfully removed; if a creditor’s tag
P148F

P

148. The debtor would of course have an incentive to cooperate with this arrangement,
or risk being in default of their agreement as well as not receiving any further financing
from the creditor.
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was wrongfully removed, the law would permit a short window or
grace period in which it could vindicate its interest in the oven,
otherwise its interest would be forfeited as to a good-faith buyer or
to another creditor who loaned money on the collateral in good
faith and otherwise took steps to perfect its interest. Challenges to
the subsequent buyer or lender (after a short initial period in
which the original claim could be vindicated) would be limited to
lack of good faith.
More to the point, there would be no need for the elaborate
panoply of UCC rules concerning proceeds and after-acquired
property; if the lender wished to obtain more collateral as it came
in, it could simply have the debtor’s employees tag and scan such
collateral, and thus smoothly add it to the monitoring system.
Otherwise, a perfected security interest would not extend beyond
the particular tagged item, thus vastly reducing the risk to
competing creditors of being ambushed by a “secret lien” obtained
by virtue of the proceeds rules.
As for the inventory, we can picture boxes of frozen or
refrigerated meat, pallets of vegetables, bottles of alcohol, and so
on. The proposal would permit security interests in these goods to
be perfected by two different means. One is now familiar:
individually tagging the items as they arrive. This might not be as
cumbersome as it sounds. Consider a box of frozen salmon fillets
or a bottle of bourbon. The box or bottle could be tagged cheaply,
and as long as it was intact would retain significant value as
collateral. To be sure, neither one empty bottle nor box would be
worth much, and a creditor might have a hard time detecting from
afar whether bottles were full or not. On the other hand, as
discussed above, WiFi-enabled camera technology is readily
available, and it is easy to imagine that a creditor could ascertain
whether the hundred bottles of bourbon or boxes of frozen salmon
in a supply pantry or refrigerator were empty, or whether they
were unopened and full of their valuable contents. As bottles or
boxes were taken out of storage and used, the creditor could
monitor the replenishment of its collateral or the payments made
with respect to the consumption of such inventory.
If the creditor deemed tagging to be infeasible, a second option
would be available: a geolocated claim for a specified type of
collateral on premises. To obtain such an interest, all that would
be required would be the registration of latitude and longitude
coordinates with the Secretary of State, along with a statement of
the type of collateral claimed (“all assets,” as under the current
regime, could be an option). Again, any debtor would have the
right to challenge such a claim at any time. Aside from the
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indexing by location rather than debtor name, this option largely
resembles the existing system. There are several significant
ramifications of this distinction. Because claims are limited to that
location, they are thus more transparent to third parties, more
certain for the claimant (who does not have to worry about “hidden
liens” encumbering property in that location), as well as more
fragile, since the security interest will be lost as to property taken
off those premises. The limitation encourages monitoring/diligence
on behalf of secured parties, although again, in light of the
availability of remote, automated monitoring technology such as
WiFi-enabled cameras and sensors, the burden would be relatively
light. What is gained is certainty concerning legal rights.
To take another example, consider a factory producing goods
for sale out of raw materials. Tagging goods that are being
warehoused would certainly seem possible in many cases, for
instance, large pieces of timber or commodities being stored for
later shipment. In other cases, tagging raw materials might not be
feasible, particularly if they are being transformed into
manufactured or processed goods. As with the salmon and bourbon
examples above, WiFi-enabled sensors could readily and
automatically transmit real-time information concerning the
collateral present in a given warehouse, silo, tank, or other space
(moisture levels, weight/volume/density, would all be possible).
But once the raw materials change form, they would have to be
tagged again (presumably the original tag(s) would have been
compromised or destroyed in the manufacturing process).
Alternatively, they could be otherwise included, for instance, as
part of an all-assets claim in the geolocation-based filing.
Presumably, the geolocated claim would be preferred in most such
cases.
This Part has explained the substance and function of the
proposed new system and clarified how the new law could
plausibly provide for increased certainty in several typical secured
financing arrangements without adding significant expense. In
fact, the new law would simply give legal force to commercial
practices that are already increasingly being adopted. The next
Part provides more in-depth discussion of several potential
objections to the proposed law, which allows the weighing of its
costs and benefits more clearly.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
This Part considers several objections that might be made to
the proposed system, ranging from the practical to the more
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philosophical. Section A considers whether the benefits of the
proposed system outweigh the costs of it (including the costs of
transitioning). Section B examines the relationship of the
proposed system to the currently common practice of all-asset
lending. Section C discusses whether particular political
constituencies would oppose the amendments. Section D explains
how the proposed system would deal with certain hard-tocategorize classes of assets, such as deposit accounts. Section E
answers objections about the overlap of the proposed regime with
other bodies of law, such as real estate law. Section F discusses
privacy concerns that the proposed system might present. Section
G outlines potential problems of access to, and participation in, the
proposed system that might be faced by small businesses,
consumers, and other commercially unsophisticated parties, and
suggests some ways of easing those difficulties. Finally, Section H
explores the discomfort that the proposed system might provoke
as an apparent step toward a world of total technological control
that could reach down to the level of each individual object and
area on the entire earth.
This Part concludes that even in light of its costs and some
potential concerns, the proposal presents a considerable
improvement over the existing system.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Disrupting the Status Quo
One obvious challenge to the proposal is purely practical.
There are costs: costs to changes in the legal system and costs to
creditors for updated technological and monitoring requirements.
Do the proposal’s promised benefits exceed its likely costs?
In terms of legal change, the costs may be limited. The
language of the amendments would have to be drafted and passed
through the appropriate political channels, with uniform law
bodies, and in the various states. Lawyers and their clients would
have to transition to the new system. Disputes would arise as to
the interpretation of numerous sections, and courts and law
drafters would be busy filling gaps and clarifying ambiguities for
some period of time after passage.
On the other hand, the body of UCC law would be
dramatically simplified by the proposals. Numerous complicated
provisions of the current law that strive to balance the interests of
present and potential creditors would be cut in favor of more
certainty and simplicity. In sum, the costs of legal change would
be concentrated in the transition period and would likely be
balanced by the benefits after that period.
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In terms of practical changes, the proposal might seem to
require more vigilance from creditors to maintain their interests
in collateral. To be sure, the new proposal explicitly contemplates
that if a creditor fails to detect the movement of collateral outside
of a geolocated zone, after a grace period passes, perfection over
that property lapses. If an IoT monitor or tag is removed such that
another interest holder cannot perceive the interest, after a
similar grace period, the interest again lapses. These rules require
continuous monitoring to maintain full protection; whereas under
the current system, interests usually remain perfected, even if
property is moved around or altered—or disposed of in exchange
for other property.
In practical terms, however, the differences may be more
illusory than real. Although the current system does not require
the same level of vigilance, a creditor that is not monitoring its
collateral can hardly expect to maintain its interest in that
collateral. Under the current regime, without a secured creditor
carefully monitoring collateral, it seems impossible to believe that
its legal rights, while technically protected, are in fact worth much.
The original drafter of Article 9, Grant Gilmore, put it like this:
Article 9 does make it possible for a lender to take a security
interest in all of a debtor’s present and future property,
advance his money, sit back and take no further interest in
what goes on. He will not be well advised to do this. This
hypothetical course of action makes little or no sense from a
business or banking point of view. 149
P149F

This insight would remain true under the new regime as
under the old. Whatever its legal rights may be, an inattentive
creditor risks significant loss of personal property collateral, which
is relatively moveable, not difficult to spirit away. If a creditor has
not found the collateral worth monitoring in any meaningful way
under the current system, it is unlikely to do so under the new
system, and apparently it does not anticipate any resultant losses
being particularly severe. Of course, insofar as the creditor is
monitoring collateral, the proposed system would represent little
additional imposition. In other words, there is a general principle,
which holds true under both the current and the proposed regimes:
if collateral is worth having, it is worth monitoring.
Indeed, the practical need for monitoring, even under the
current system, is one reason that monitoring technologies have
come into widespread use. As discussed above, the technology is

149.

Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 299 (1966).
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continuing to improve and is neither particularly expensive nor
complicated to use, so there are few barriers to wider adoption.
Without better data concerning the pervasiveness of such
technologies in commercial practice, it is difficult to assess what
the actual costs of transition would be. It seems entirely possible
that over the five to ten years required to bring the proposed
system fully into force, most or all secured creditors would have
already availed themselves of the requisite technologies—whether
for monitoring of collateral or for the numerous other purposes
such technology serves, such as supply chain management,
regulatory compliance, security, and so on.
If that turns out to be the case, then the actual additional
costs to creditors would approach zero. The corresponding benefit
would be, of course, the curtailment of the existing Article 9
requirements and their attendant uncertainties.
B. “All-Asset” Lending
A related concern arises from the current practice of “allasset” or “blanket” lending. The current practice of secured lending
is a grant of security interests in all assets of the debtor, as a
default. Many, perhaps most, secured transactions grant security
on this basis, and this has been the case for at least several
decades. 150 The result of this practice is that the most common type
of security interest is what is known colloquially as a blanket
lien—a lien on all of the debtor’s property. 151 Although this is an
issue that merits exploration in future work, the proposed system
may be able to accommodate the current practices of all-asset
lenders with fairly little disruption. 152
P150F

P

P15F

P

P152F

150. See, e.g., Morris G. Shanker, A Proposal for a Simplified All-Embracing Security
Interest, 14 UCC L.J. 23, 26–27 (1981) (noting that “an all-embracing lien, that is, a security
interest on all of the debtor’s property. . . . is what most secured parties want, and that is
what most of them are now getting”).
151. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
589, 595–96.
152. There are fierce debates about such liens from efficiency and equity standpoints.
While Shanker takes no view on the desirability of the “all-embracing lien,” he suggests
that if the law is to permit such liens, it should not complicate the process of claiming them
without reason:
If the law intends that security over all of the debtor’s assets can be obtained . . .
by simply copying from a boiler-plate list of words found in Article 9, then why
even require it? At best, continuing to require this boiler-plate list can serve only
as a trap for those who, by reason of inadvertence or lack of proper advice, fail to
copy it precisely. And that seems a poor reason to penalize these unfortunate
souls.
See Shanker, supra note 150, at 26. This proposal was almost entirely implemented in later
versions of the UCC, although “unfortunate souls” are still occasionally caught in the few
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Under the proposal, all assets could be claimed with only
slightly more work than the current system. A claim on intangible
assets would be made largely as under the current system
(although neither these nor other claims would benefit from the
current system’s expansive proceeds protection). A claim on
tangible assets in a given location could be made easily by a
geolocation claim. The security interests thus perfected could
“float” over future intangibles and over tangible assets brought on
premises. With a few clicks and keystrokes, a security interest
over much of a debtor’s property could be perfected remotely and
quickly. The new system would be inconvenient only when debtors
have a very large number of locations or many items of collateral
constantly on the move. Even then, the proposed IoT and
geolocation technologies are unlikely to require significant
adjustments.
Similarly, the additional monitoring requirements of the new
system on such a creditor would likely be manageable. As
mentioned above, and as recognized decades ago by Article 9’s lead
drafter Grant Gilmore, if the creditor actually cares about the
collateral, it must monitor those materials anyway. For creditors
who lack the energy to monitor, their “all-assets” claim may cover
far fewer assets than intended.
Finally, because the proposed system reduces “secret lien”
possibilities, the proposed system would often help protect the
hypothetical, “lazy” all-assets creditor, who might not bother to
investigate much prior to claiming the lien. Also, the proposed
system would facilitate easy and certain means of carving out
exceptions to an “all-assets” lien. This would provide a sort of
natural experiment to shed light on when and why the all-asset
approach remains appealing, by providing other easy and reliable
options for “slicing” a debtor’s property more finely among
different security interests.
If, despite the above argument, proponents of the all-asset
practice were to stand implacably opposed to the proposed system,
it might be possible to modify the proposed system to appease
them. The existing filing system could be left in place and permit
traps that remain. See, e.g., In re Lexington Hosp. Grp., LLC, No. 17-51568, 94 UCC Rep.
Serv. (West) 42, 2017 WL 5035081, at *11 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 1, 2017) (denying creditor
relief because financing statement failed to list the necessary collateral and therefore
holding the security interest unperfected). Even under existing law, there may be personal
property interests that even an “all-asset” lien does not encompass—and that some argue
it should not encompass. See, e.g., Janger, supra note 151, at 595 (“[I]nvestors often speak
of ‘blanket liens’ as if there is such a thing.”). Janger notes that there are “gaps” in the
“blanket” such that parts of a debtor’s property are not covered by it. Id. at 596–97 & n.41
(citing examples).
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for all-asset filings on the basis of the debtor’s identity only to
perfect as to all of the debtor’s assets. Such perfection would be
limited to original and after-acquired collateral and would not
extend to proceeds. The all-assets filing would lose priority to valid
geolocated or IoT-based claims; in other words, it would not defeat
parties who had perfected through one of these other means, even
after the “all-assets” filing was made. Essentially, it would only
trump unsecured creditors and creditors who have attempted to
levy on collateral of the debtor pursuant to a judicial lien. 153 This
proposed modification would protect the current all-assets practice
while allowing for the implementation of the proposed system,
although it might have troubling distributive consequences, which
are worth exploring but beyond the scope of this Article. 154
In sum, the proposed system would not necessarily represent
a major burden or disruption to current all-asset practice. That
practice might ultimately diminish, however, if creditors find that
the proposed system provides a sufficient increase in certainty
that more limited security interests will allow them to meet their
financing needs without resorting to the broad brush of “all
assets.” Thus, the proposed system might unlock new and more
efficient lending practices, carving up collateral more precisely.
P153F

P

P154F

C. Political Resistance
Proposed amendments to law commonly run into difficulties
because of opposition by entrenched interests. For instance, there
have been credible proposals to use technology to consolidate and
simplify existing real estate recording systems, but they have
encountered resistance and made only sporadic progress. 155
Proposals concerning the UCC, such as proposals to nationalize
the UCC filing system, have failed to take hold. 156 The uniform law
process, by which Article 9 is amended, has been subject to
P15F

P156F

P

P

153. This would include the trustee in bankruptcy standing in the shoes of a lien
creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012).
154. It might be seen to further disadvantage “involuntary” or “nonadjusting”
creditors, who are already disfavored, without clear normative justification. See, e.g.,
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 869–70 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with
Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1389
(1997); see also Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 31–33 (1981) (noting the flaws in “offensive” and
“defensive” distributional explanations).
155. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
156. See Janzen, supra note 125, at 394, 402 (noting failures in the new filing system
proposals in the United States); LoPucki, supra note 27, at 6, 15–16 (noting a number of
failed proposals to reform the filing system).
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extensive analysis and critique. 157 Would a similar fate await this
Article’s proposal?
State filing officers might have an interest in maintaining a
status quo that generates fees and employment. But they might
see their role, if anything, enhanced by a system that would
require creditors to have frequent recourse to IoT and geolocation
systems maintained by filing offices. Some officers might resist the
transition, which would entail significant start-up investments in
infrastructure and training. However, it is also possible that these
costs could be rapidly recovered in filing fees. There would be a
likely spike in such fees upon implementation of the proposed
system.
By shifting filings away from debtors’ states of incorporation
and to the location of collateral, the proposal would divert business
from filing offices of common states of incorporation like Delaware.
These common states of incorporation may therefore be opposed to
the proposal. On the other hand, the move to state of incorporation
is itself a relatively recent phenomenon, and thus undoing it might
not prove very jarring. In addition, business would be diverted to
a larger number of states, and their interests may outweigh
concentrated resistance of major incorporation states.
Other potential opponents might be firms that gather creditrelated information and sell access to the public. Conceivably, such
firms (which can be termed “information intermediaries” 158) might
resist change because they are reluctant to adjust to a new regime,
or they fear that making information too easily available will
“democratize away” the very need for their businesses. But the
former concern would arise only if companies thought the
transition costs or barriers to entry to the new system would
disadvantage them versus their competition. In fact, specialty
firms likely could transition quickly due to their expertise, and
thus maintain their advantages. A similar dynamic would likely
answer the second concern. When the information-dissemination
possibilities of the internet were newly discovered, some
companies in the information business had concerns that the value
of their expertise would diminish. But the opposite has proven
true: with such a vast quantity and wide range of data available,
data-gathering and data-analysis have become more difficult and
P157F

P

P158F

P

157. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
158. See Mann, supra note 25, at 2269 (noting the role of credit reporters as
“information intermediaries”); Lipson, supra note 28, at 452; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1941 (1994).
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more necessary, which has made them even bigger business than
before. 159 In addition, such companies’ interests are aligned with
the broader purpose of this Article’s proposal, namely the
facilitation of commerce through increased certainty and
decreased costs. Their business grows along with growth of
commercial and financial activities and benefits from changes that
bring growth.
For these reasons, it is unclear whether the proposal would
run into insurmountable political obstacles. As with other matters
regarding the process of implementation of any major reforms to
Article 9, this is a question that deserves further study.
P159F

P

D. Borderline-Tangible and Other Complicated Assets
The regime governing intangible assets would be left largely
in place, under my proposal. 160 Other assets present problems,
however: negotiable instruments, cash, and investment properties
such as certificated securities, all of which are “tangible” but
present unusual features. Some of these assets most resemble
intangible assets, and they should probably be perfected by debtor
name as under the present system. Securities, for instance, are
typically held by repositories such as the Depository Trust
Company and indexed under the name of the owner of the security.
For these, the use of debtor’s name as a means of perfection is
unlikely to mislead.
By contrast, assets susceptible to geolocating—cash in a
register, for instance—could be perfected as under the proposed
new regime. Similarly, negotiable instruments may be sufficiently
tangible to apply the proposed system, requiring a creditor either
to stake a geolocated claim or to tag the individual instruments
(which could be done without damaging them).
In sum, additional consideration and line-drawing will be
required for these complicated asset classes, but they do not
present any serious threat to the proposal.
P160F

P

159. One firm incorporates 1.3 billion updates to skip-tracing records per month. What
Makes Experian’s Skip Tracing Tools Better?, EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/smallbusiness/skip-tracing-tools-software.jsp [https://perma.cc/JT3J-C9BA] (last visited Apr. 16,
2019). Dun & Bradstreet offers its own data for business credit monitoring and the data of
a dozen partners across a range of industries. Data Exchange Partners, DUN &
BRADSTREET, https://developer.dnb.com/marketplace/dataexchange/partners [https://perm
a.cc/MG7T-V46A] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
160. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
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E. Article 9’s Overlap with Related Areas of Law
Others might object that the proposed regime would
complicate the interface between Article 9 and other bodies of law,
most notably real estate laws. This interface comes into play, for
instance, when personal property is transformed into part of real
property. Imagine a heater being installed into a house, or a sound
system into a music venue. There are inevitable tensions and gray
areas between real and personal property laws in such cases, as
would be expected.
The proposal does not change the balance between the real
estate and UCC systems. The proposal affects perfection (and
lapse of perfection) in interests in personal property. Where the
current system awards priority to interests in real property over
those in personal property, or to those in personal property over
real property, there is no need for change.
That said, the real estate system could perhaps be improved
by similar disruptions—specifically the use of geolocation
technologies for the recording of land lending and purchase
documents. If such improvements were made to the real estate
system, then it seems plausible that greater integration of the real
estate and personal property systems would be possible,
benefitting both bodies of law by decreasing uncertainties,
requiring fewer steps to claim or to search out security interests
in personal property, in real property, or in the contested, inbetween categories.
F. Privacy
Another objection that the proposed system might provoke is
that information concerning exact scopes of property holdings
would be more readily available and might intrude on legitimate
trade secrecy interests or simple privacy interests. IoT
technologies have raised these concerns in numerous areas of
law. 161
As noted, however, what would be disclosed would be
minimal. As under the current system, the goal would be for the
filing to provide inquiry notice only—enough of a trail for reliable
inquiry to be made. For an IoT-based claim, a registration number
and the secured creditor name and contact information are all that
would be publicly available. For a geolocated claim, all that is
needed aside from the location would be the name and contact
P16F

161.

See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 79, at 130–33.
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information for the secured party or its agent. In the rare case that
even the location information would reveal some information that
is personally or commercially sensitive, then a move to the tagging
system should usually be possible.
Arguments could potentially be made for the current UCC
filing system to include more encompassing information about
transactions, whether based on public-good rationales or contract
rationales. The Article 9 filing system could serve as a location for
all relevant transaction information, as the real estate records at
least theoretically are. 162 The system proposed here could
accommodate such a change, but an analysis of whether such a
change is worthwhile is beyond the scope of this Article.
Because all that would be required under the proposal is
enough for searchers to be put on inquiry notice and given
sufficient information to enquire as to the source of a potentially
conflicting claim (and debtors would be given sufficient chance to
challenge claims clouding the title of their collateral), the intrusion
on privacy should be minimal.
P162F

P

G. Access and Participation by Small Businesses, Consumers,
and Other Commercially Unsophisticated Parties
Another concern might be that use of new, more
technologically sophisticated requirements for filing and
monitoring collateral puts too much of an onus on parties with
little commercial sophistication. The proposed regime might
impose new barriers on parties’ access to markets and access to
justice—on their access to the legal protections of the secured
transaction system.
It is not clear that access would be any more difficult under
the proposed system. Perfecting and maintaining a security
interest in the current system requires accuracy and diligence
beyond the means of many small-time players and leaves
uncertainty even for those who take reasonable precautions. 163
The proposed system strips away various complicated legal
provisions that represent traps for the unwary.
There is no reason to think that cost would be prohibitive.
While technologically sophisticated, the tools required to claim
P163F

P

162. One rationale for requiring more transaction information to be disclosed, for
instance, could be that the availability of the records of underlying transactions could allow
subsequent creditors to gain, more easily than now, a more thoroughgoing view of a debtor’s
finances. There are of course many counterarguments, such as the administrative costs, the
potential disclosure of trade secrets, and so on. The question of the optimal amount of
disclosure for a filing system to require is not a simple one.
163. See supra Section II.A.2.
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and maintain an interest in the new system are widely available
off-the-rack. As technology develops, the costs of claiming an
interest and monitoring collateral should drop even more. Finally,
by adding certainty, the proposal should make financing cheaper
and more available under standard economic assumptions,
benefitting marginal borrowers whose access to credit might
otherwise be limited.
Consumers are accorded special treatment in some parts of
Article 9, and they might be entitled to continued special
treatment under the proposed system. 164 Historically, consumers,
the goods they buy, and the transactions they enter were thought
to require exemptions because of consumers’ presumed lack of
sophistication in secured transactions law and because it is more
desirable to foster easy commerce in consumer goods than to
subject such commerce to the usual rules of secured transactions.
A fuller explanation of the rationales for such treatment is elusive
in part because the exceptions granted to consumers, consumer
transactions, and consumer goods are spotty and inconsistent at
best, and probably not coherent under any single rationale. A full
treatment of potential new approaches to security interests in
consumer goods would require more consideration than is possible
here. If desired, the status quo could be maintained: it would be
possible to except consumers, consumer goods, and consumer
transactions from the proposed system by granting them priority
despite an otherwise perfected interest, or by leaving other special
provisions in place, such as the automatic perfection of certain
security interests in consumer goods. 165 Such exceptions would be
no more disruptive than they are now.
More to the point, under the proposed system, consumers
would have less to worry about. The geolocation approach would
likely be preferred for small-time, everyday consumer goods, and
once those goods left the designated area upon purchase (and the
grace period passed), the interest would lapse, and the consumer
would have nothing to worry about. If the IoT approach has been
taken with respect to a particular item, then there is potentially
more concern, and the consumer might have to look to the
protections for “buyers in the ordinary course,” which should in
most cases be sufficient. 166
P164F

P165F

P

P

P16F

164. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1999).
165. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (mentioning special provisions for
consumer goods).
166. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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If consumers desire to hold an item free of any security
interest, at most, they could be required to scan an item to make
sure it was not tagged with a continuing security interest before
their purchase. This could be done by an application on a
smartphone; or it could be done by virtue of a tool provided by the
seller at time of sale, as a demonstration that no IoT-perfected
interest is being claimed. A scan for IoT tags could even be
integrated into the checkout scanning process, and then
integrated with existing credit card payment processing systems
or new payment platforms such as Apple Pay. Thus, a consumer
could make a one-time selection only to approve payments for
items that have scanned as “free-and-clear” at time of purchase,
and never think about it again. Alternatively, as a policy matter,
it might not be thought feasible to require a consumer to make
such an inquiry, and thus a policy decision could be made for
consumers to automatically take free and clear. Such an exception
could of course be included in the amended Article 9 text.
H. Universal Property Registers and Maps of Everything: A
Prelude to Dystopia?
A final objection is the general sense of unease that the
proposal might provoke. The world imagined in the proposal may
seem futuristic—in some ways utopian and ideal, and in others
dystopian and nightmarish. The proposal might seem
inadequately to account for the societal implications of the
technological changes it relies upon.
Technological change has always brought change to law.
Technologies have a way of upending assumptions about what is
feasible or reasonable, and disrupting bodies of law developed
based on those assumptions. On-the-ground realities shift such
that once-sensible legal rules rapidly become ineffective or
counter-productive. Vast swathes of law, both public and private,
may need to be remade. Examples from the rapid development of
technology in recent decades are easy to come by. The rise of adhoc workers and independent contracting in the “gig economy” will
remake employment law and other bodies of law. 167 The
deployment of AI to make decisions and provide services will
P167F

P

167. See, e.g., V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact
of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 749–
58 (explaining gig economy and assessing its relationship to existing law). Related is the
rise of the “sharing economy,” which also presents challenges across numerous bodies of
regulation at every level of government. See, e.g., Abbey Stemler, Betwixt & Between:
Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 63–69 (2016).
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challenge notions of responsibility and agency. 168 Technologicallyenabled and automated forms of exchange and corporate
enterprise will require development of new commercial and
corporate laws. 169 Data gathering and analytics will challenge
notions of privacy and property in personal information. 170 Human
body augmentations and prosthetics that may stretch notions of
personhood and identity. The continued development of remote
warfare capabilities, like remote-controlled drones and “smart”
missiles, will continue to challenge the laws of war and
humanitarianism. 171 There are even more exotic examples of
bodies of law that will have to be developed—for instance, the law
that will govern activities undertaken in “virtual worlds,” that is,
in online social spaces inhabited only by computer-generated
“avatars.” 172
The IoT and geolocation technologies at the heart of the
proposal in this Article are working broad but uncertain changes
in both law and society. Making use of these technologies’
capabilities, the proposal amounts to a plan for precisely
identifying, mapping, tracking, monitoring potentially millions or
billions of individual items throughout their entire useful life. It
imagines interactive, publicly available maps, accurate to within
a few feet at most, which parties can rely upon to structure their
financial dealings and to adjudicate property disputes. It assumes
the longstanding, continuous availability of a vast amount of
computing power and storage capacity, as well as widespread,
high-capacity communication networks. It is premised on users
who will integrate all of these technological capabilities
thoroughly into their everyday business activities.
No doubt, this interconnected and sensor-laden world still
P168F

P169F

P

P

P170F

P17F

P

P

P172F

168. See, e.g., Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’
Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2017).
169. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules & Standards,
92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1403 (2017) (analyzing some likely ramification of technologies for “gapfilling” contracts); Carla Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373
(2019) (discussing appropriate legal structures under business organizations law for
“decentralized autonomous organizations” and similar new forms of technologically enabled
ventures).
170. See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 79; Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60
SMU L. REV. 1605, 1617–20 (2007) (discussing effects of emerging technologies on effective
rights including right to privacy).
171. See, e.g., Veronica Ma, The Ethics and Implications of Modern Warfare: Robotic
Systems and Human Optimization, HARV. INT’L REV., Summer 2016, at 43 (providing
overview of emerging legal and ethical issues of warfare technology).
172. See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the
Surveillance Society, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 131 (2009).
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seems futuristic. As a result, it is no wonder that the proposed
system seems a step toward a sort of electronic panopticon, a world
of total technological tracking and control that could reach down
the level of each individual object and space on the globe. 173 And,
while it still seems futuristic, the proposal is not quixotic—this is
not a situation in which law would far outstrip facts. To the
contrary, the practice of commercial and even governmental actors
already mirrors, in many ways, what is proposed here. The
proposed system for perfecting security interests in personal
property would integrate easily with other systems involving
extensive geolocation and IoT that already pervade the business
world and increasingly, link to technologically connected (“smart”)
homes.
Thus, the time is ripe for scholarship both to consider the
ways in which this technology should affect law, as well as the
broader concerns about policy and society that it may provoke.
These two strands of work cannot be undertaken in isolation; they
must inform one another.
This Article deals with a set of normative questions
concerning
how
existing
or
anticipated
technological
developments can help to develop, supplant, or be integrated into
existing bodies of law. Others have begun to explore similar
questions in analogous areas of law. For instance, in fascinating
recent work, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl have recently proposed a
system to reallocate property rights based on a publicly available,
continually updated registry of ownership of essentially all
property. Essentially, the way the Posner-Weyl system would
work is that owners would provide a self-assessed valuation of all
of their property, pay regular taxes based upon that valuation, and
be continually at risk of losing any asset they place too low a value
on, because anyone could purchase their assets for the announced
valuation (plus some small amount to cover transaction costs) at
any time. Implementation of the Posner-Weyl universal property
registry—which they term the cadaster—would require heavy
P173F

P

173. For canonical discussions of the notion of a panopticon, see JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE &
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–230 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1977); see also Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical
Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 28 (1995) (“The Panopticon was Jeremy
Bentham’s plan for a prison in which large numbers of convicts could be kept under
surveillance by very few guards. . . . The French philosopher Michel Foucault used
Bentham’s Panopticon as an ominous metaphor for the mechanisms of large-scale social
control that characterize the modern world.”).
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reliance on IoT and geolocation technologies. 174 Obviously, the
Posner-Weyl cadaster bears a strong resemblance to the proposed
secured transactions system explored in this Article.
In terms of work on broader policy concerns, scholars have
begun to explore the ramifications of technologies discussed here
and proposed ways of addressing them. 175 It seems increasingly
likely that human society is facing a major shift as a result of the
advance of communications, processing, and network technologies.
In the same way that the Domesday Book dramatically increased
the legibility of real property in medieval England and exemplified
a paradigm shift in record-keeping and in legal consciousness with
respect to property rights, 176 the IoT seems likely to transform
numerous of our society’s fundamental notions (including that of
property itself) in quite sweeping and profound ways. 177 There are
P174F

P175F

P176F

P

P

P

P17F

P

174. Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Another Name for Monopoly, 19 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 51, 54 (2017); RADICAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 30–79.
175. Numerous law articles have considered the rise of IoT and related technologies
as potential panopticons in various legal and societal realms. See, e.g., Sean C. Helms,
Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 288, 290 (2001)
(exploring ways of preserving user anonymity online in light of pervasive surveillance
technologies that are “moving us toward a ‘Cyber-Panopticon’”); Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff,
Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 94 (2005)
(“[T]he Internet will soon invade real space as networked computing elements become
embedded into physical objects and environments . . . . [T]he physical world will gain digital
qualities, such as computer-addressability through unique identification codes . . . . If the
line between cyberspace and real space has grown increasingly difficult to draw, it may
soon become impossible.”); Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, “Code” and the Slow Erosion
of Privacy, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 116, 184 (2005) (concluding that in
numerous areas of law, including “law enforcement, national security, E-government, and
commerce,” technology has generally eroded privacy); Marcy Peek, The Observer and the
Observed: Re-Imagining Privacy Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law, 8 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 51 (2009) (exploring implications of technological and related social
changes on areas of legal doctrine in the areas of privacy); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936, 1940 (2013) (explaining concerns that the
rise of government and corporate surveillance “menaces our intellectual privacy and
threatens the development of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the basic
commitments of democratic societies,” and citing “software, RFID chips, GPS trackers,
cameras, and other cheap sensors” as “the technologies of surveillance”); Rebecca Rubin,
Note, Smart Dust: Just a Speck Goes a Long Way in the Erosion of Fundamental Privacy
Rights, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 329, 330–31 (2015) (describing the nanotechnology of “[s]mart
dust, miniature sensors proposed to be smaller than what the naked eye can see,” and
noting its potential to erode privacy and surveillance norms); Kevin Werbach, Sensors &
Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2322 (2007) (“The sensor revolution will challenge
hidden assumptions in a bewildering array of doctrinal fields, including contracts, evidence,
trade secrets, patents, criminal law, securities regulation, and many others. The initial
legal impacts of pervasive sensors will be both diffuse and unsettling.”); Timothy Zick,
Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59
FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (assessing the First Amendment implications of the “networking of
public places” including by IoT technologies).
176. See generally M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND
1066-1307 (2d ed. 1993).
177. The beginning of this shift predates the IoT, because it goes back at least to the
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elements of technological development, both from the perspective
of law and of society more generally, that can be alternatively
worrisome and promising. This work is valuable and necessary.
But it would be unwise to leave aside the work of this Article, or
that of Posner and Weyl, which probes ways in which the law can
begin to be adapted to these emerging technologies, to accomplish
policy goals.
Thus, the approach taken in this Article is a way of informing
future work on broader policy implications, concerning the threats
and possibilities opened by new technologies, 178 but it is also a
necessary concession to reality, to the technological facts on the
ground. An amended Article 9 may not take the form imagined in
this Article, or even rely upon the technologies outlined here. 179
But there is no doubt that the current Article 9 filing system
technology is outdated and will only become more so in coming
years. Without being brought closer into accord with actual
commercial practices, it will recede ever further toward
irrelevance. If amendment does not occur, then that will represent
P178F

P

P179F

P

innovation of the bar code, the importance and unlikely success of which remains
remarkable. See generally STEPHEN A. BROWN, REVOLUTION AT THE CHECKOUT COUNTER:
THE EXPLOSION OF THE BAR CODE (1997) (providing an institutional history of the bar code,
written by an insider in the process); Margalit Fox, Alan Haberman, Who Ushered in the
Bar Code, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at B19 (quoting Haberman as discussing
the importance of the invention of the UPC (the universal product code, the central feature
of bar codes) in the most grandiose terms imaginable: “‘Go back to Genesis and read about
the Creation’ . . . ‘God says, “I will call the night ‘night’; I will call the heavens ‘heaven.’”
Naming was important. Then the Tower of Babel came along and messed everything up. In
effect, the U.P.C. has put everything back into one language, a kind of Esperanto, that
works for everyone.’”); Varchaver, supra note 90 (discussing the history of the bar code and
the IoT as its successor).
178. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 175, at 2323 (“The best response to the coming
sensor revolution, therefore, is not to panic. Anticipating and appreciating the impacts of
pervasive sensors is the best way to shepherd the law through a challenging transition
process.”).
179. There have, for instance, been moves toward trying to use the blockchain or other
distributed ledger technologies for simplifying and improving some aspects of the filing
system. See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 27, at 402–03, 417–21 (proposing use of distributed
ledger technologies like blockchain for UCC-1 filings); Andrea Tinianow et al., Delaware’s
2017 Resolution: Making Blockchain a Reality, COINDESK (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.coindesk.com/what-expect-delaware-blockchain-initiative-2017/ [https://perm
a.cc/DR9P-WYGN] (article by then-director of Delaware Blockchain Initiative and others
discussing Delaware’s initiatives, including the initiatives to give UCC filers “the
opportunity to use smart-contract versions of UCC documents on a distributed ledger”);
Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the
Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delawareblockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/
[https://perma.cc/AE25-6Z8N] (explaining and predicting adoption of distributed ledgerbased “‘smart UCC’ filings” to improve the filing system, “which is still surprisingly paperbased, slow and error-prone”).
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not a victory for our commercial law, but a defeat.
VI. CONCLUSION
That doesn’t mean that the Internet of Things will triumph,
because, in some ways, it can’t win. It’s too broad and vague
to win; it’s a huge, looming infrastructural phenomenon,
much like ‘electrification’ or ‘automation’ once were. People
never voted to become electrical or automated.
–Bruce Sterling, Tech Author and Journalist, 2014 180
P180 F

The global industrial sector is poised to undergo a fundamental structural change akin to the industrial revolution as we
usher in the IoT.
–Equity Research, Goldman Sachs, 2014 181
P18 F

Perhaps, in law as in politics, what appears to be a revolution
is merely the recognition de jure of what has long since taken
place de facto.
–Grant Gilmore, Principal Drafter of Article 9 of UCC, 1966 182
P182 F

P

There have been numerous sensible proposals for
streamlining the secured transactions system in light of advances
in technology. 183 This proposal goes much further than other
proposals because under it, the underlying structure of the Article
9 filing system would change from debtor-based indexing to
collateral-based identification. The proposal removes a detour
through the debtor’s name and location and allows collateral to
“speak for itself,” using newly feasible technological means.
The proposal has two main benefits. First, the proposal better
accords with the notion of a security interest as a direct
relationship between a creditor and an item of collateral, in
addition to the theory of notice that underlies the concept of
perfection. Numerous provisions of Article 9 could be simplified or
eliminated thanks to the proposed shift.
As new realms of information technology become ever more
pervasive, this type of rethinking of fundamental legal structures
P183F

180.
181.

P

BRUCE STERLING, THE EPIC STRUGGLE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2014).
SIMONA JANKOWSKI ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: MAKING
SENSE OF THE NEXT MEGA-TREND 10 (2014), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/page
s/internet-of-things/iot-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMZ7-6KMQ].
182. Gilmore, supra note 149, at 294.
183. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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should be expected. Technological shifts challenge existing notions
about property; about social rights, responsibilities, and duties;
and about the role of law itself in a world increasingly governed
not just by law but, as Larry Lessig has put it, by “code.” 184 In
many cases, technology will render existing laws unnecessary, as
in the case of the Article 9 filing regime. In other cases, it will
necessitate the formation of new legal frameworks and new bodies
of law.
Second, the proposed shift helps Article 9 better reflect
commercial reality, which is a historically grounded and stillimportant goal of the UCC. From manufacture through sale,
businesses have changed and will continue to change their
practices to reflect technological advancements, including those
that permit simplified identification, tracking, and monitoring of
property from place to place and owner to owner. Chief among the
advancements that have already revolutionized business are the
technologies underlying geolocation and the Internet of Things.
The proposal would use technology that is already being widely
adopted by businesses, and in doing so, would permit notice of
security interests to be provided more confidently and cheaply. As
the statute the emerged most closely and most triumphantly from
the leaders of the “Legal Realist” movement, it is appropriate that
the UCC remains a frontier where evolving business practices and
technological capacity would lead to reassessment and legal
change.
To lawyers, the disruption of UCC Article 9 proposed here
might seem dramatic and unsettling. To clients, the changes might
have the opposite effect. For them, the changes might be seen to
P184F

P

184. Lessig argued that computer code functions as a substitute for, or a parallel
governance regime to, law. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5
(1999). Joshua Fairfield has explored aspects of this idea in the realm of property and
commercial law. Law has not taken proper account of the power of information technologies,
in part because legal thinkers have failed to recognize that much of law is about the
facilitation of a flow of information. For instance, Fairfield states that “[p]roperty is the law
of lists and ledgers. County land records, stock certificate entries, mortgage registries,
Uniform Commercial Code filings on personal property . . . are all merely entries in a list,
determining who owns what.” Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805,
805, 807 (2015). He argues “[p]roperty has not benefitted from the scaling effect of
drastically reduced information costs because property law has been traditionally
understood as being concerned with tangible objects, rather than information.” Id. at 811;
see also JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM 135 (2017) (“Property is all about information. In fact, traditional property rights
are nothing but information: information about who may do what with which
resource over which time period.”). His view aligns with this Article, which proposes to give
legal force to new forms of object-based communication, and discard information (the
debtor’s identity) that has frustrated the flow of relevant information. In essence, this
Article proposes to simplify the “code” of the UCC filing system.
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cut away a layer of artificial paperwork and replace it with a
simpler and more predictable system. The new law of security
interests would be more reflective of commercial reality and more
reliable in protecting the reasonable expectations of lenders,
buyers, and debtors. This proposal’s simplicity, its consistency
with the underlying notions of secured transactions doctrine, its
reliance on existing technologies, and its capacity to evolve
alongside further developments in technology and in commercial
practice, suggest that its time has arrived.

